
Russia, Central Europe and NATO Enlargement

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Russian Foreign Policy under Kozyrev

Russia had to respond to the dissolution of the Eastern Block, the Soviet Union, and the termination of the bipolar conflict under the essentially changed geopolitical conditions. The essence of the foreign policy of the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of RF, A. Kozyrev, may be summed up as follows: *Russia must avoid international isolation; it may avoid the isolation only by approaching the Western security structures in parallel with the Central European countries; in this process, the CEE coun-*

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tries must not be granted preference; at the same time it is necessary to create a Pan-European security system stretching from the Baltic to the Ural to which NATO will be subordinated, as well as the principle that Russia must become an integral part of any institutionalized security system in Europe. The development of the international situation, which shall not be in line with these principles, shall mean a new division of and confrontation in Europe.

Under the Kozyrev doctrine we have in mind here the Russian foreign policy in a form which had been attained under the pressure from Russian nationalists and realists during the Russian debate on foreign policy issues in 1992 and 1993. On the one hand, the Kozyrev doctrine for the first time clearly distinguished the post-Soviet countries of East Europe (“blizhneye zarubezhiye”) from the CEE countries (“dal’neye zarubezhiye”), however, by its understanding of the international position of Central Europe it was almost a step backward, compared to the Kvitsinsky doctrine. According to László Póti, “the Kozyrev doctrine goes one step further and does not want to implement the similar Russian goals by way of explicit prohibition in bilateral treaties, but instead it wants to put the problem (approaching the CEE countries to NATO and Western structures – author) into a wider framework and to postpone it in time.

It qualifies for the category of indirect limitation. This may convincingly be illustrated by the wording of the MFA RF document entitled “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, which was published in January 1993: “The strategic task at the current stage is to prevent East Europe from turning into a sort of buffer zone isolating us from the West. On the other hand, we cannot allow the Western powers to force Russia out of the East European region, which is already becoming a reality. This is a task which is well within our powers, considering that the states of East Europe, despite their noticeable and somewhat artificially emphasized recent political distancing from Russia, are economically, and to a significant degree also in a cultural-humanitarian respect, still oriented as before toward Russia and the other CIS countries. The primary task is to secure the positive changes which have been achieved in the course of high-level contacts, on the path toward restoring mutual trust, and to establish deideologized, equal relations with the countries of East Europe. Energetic measures in restoring economic ties are especially important.” Whereas the Kvitsinsky doctrine was of a more conditional than recommendational character of the policy of Moscow in relation to the Central European countries, duly respecting their sovereignty, characteristic of the Kozyrev doctrine were the notions like “prevent”, “not

to allow”, and the like, which were approaching the denial of the right of sovereign decision-making to the Central European countries.

The point of departure of RF to the issues of building the security structures in Europe after the disintegration of the Eastern Block and the USSR, in accordance with the spirit of the Kozyrev doctrine, may be illustrated by the formulations presented by the chairperson of an influential and opinion-making Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergey Karaganov, and the then Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs, Nikolay Afanasyevsky. As to the policy of Russia in the question of NATO enlargement, Karaganov stated: “Russia must insist on the parallel accession to NATO along with the Central European countries. Moscow has to present a choice before NATO: either you admit Russia, or you openly favour its isolation.” In his presentation on the conference “Russia in Europe: New Security Challenges” (Moscow, March 1994), Afanasyevsky clearly formulated the Russian standpoint: “Russia cannot accept an organization in which it had not the right to equal vote safeguarded in taking decisions. Even less acceptable is the perspective of creating a special security zone on the basis of NATO/WEU with the exclusion of Russia... The cooperation must be aimed at eliminating old lines of confrontation and preventing the emergence of new ones. In the post-confrontation era, one may only accept the space between the Atlantic and the Ural as a historical and geographical framework for solving the security issues in Europe.”

The only existing organization which would optimally suit the Russian interests in the new circumstances and would correspond to the above given ideas – including the decision-making mechanism – was the OSCE (formerly CSCE). By way of regularity, the aim of the Russian diplomacy was to achieve a condition in which all of the remaining main regional organizations, which have got anything to do with the European security issues (as are defined in the MFA RF document entitled “The Program of Increasing the Effectiveness of CSCE” of November, 1994: CIS, NACC, EU, Council of Europe, NATO, WEU), be coordinated by the OSCE. The original idea on the foreign-policy mission of Russia headed by Gaydar’s liberals was that the democratic and in reforms successful Russia becomes in the post-Soviet space a gravitational force, attracting the other post-Soviet republics. This was one of the reasons why Russia put across the acceptance into CSCE of all of the former Soviet republics, including those in Central Asia. By “Asianizing the CSCE”, Russia followed several aims: 1) to become a more significant partner to the West in putting across the CSCE principles within the territory where the role of Russia was irreplaceable (or at least it appeared like that in

the year 1992), in consequence of which its role as a strategic partner of the West was to increase; 2) to obtain a possibility of implementing active policy in the post-Soviet territory in the defense of rights of Russian minorities, in putting across democratic reforms, and in implementing peace-keeping missions; 3) by extending the territorial range to increase the significance of the CSCE as a key international security institution as such.

Kozyrev's foreign policy departed also from a conviction that Russia will be able to gradually acquire a status of the world super-power, relying on the strategic partnership with the United States of America. Russia remained a nuclear world power and was convinced that the United States will need in Europe a strong and stable Russia, going on in implementing its reforms, which will be able in becoming a true partner, at least in the process and control of international disarmament and in perspective also in global security. Added to this, because in January 1993, the Presidents G. Bush and B. Yeltsin signed the START 2 treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), in compliance with which both Russia and the USA undertook to decrease the number of strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2003 in two stages to the level: Russia – 3000, the USA – 3500 pieces. The policy of Bush and Clinton administrations was indeed Russocentrist in the given period of time and the discussion of NATO enlargement eastward was taking place rather in diplomatic and expert lobbies than it would have been subject of real policy. The United States, by exerting pressure on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give over their nuclear warheads to Russia pursuant to Lisbon protocol to the START 1 treaty of 1992, were confirming Moscow in their conviction on the rightfulness of the chosen foreign-policy line.

Regulation of treaty relations with Visegrád countries and the “case of Slovakia”

It appears inevitable to add that the new foreign policy which Russia formulated in the spirit of the Kozyrev doctrine at the turn of the years 1992-1993 had not been manifested clearly in signing the new bilateral treaties with the Visegrád countries. The treaties had been signed prior to achieving the domestic “realistic” consensus in the Russian foreign policy. The Visegrád countries developed their diplomatic success in the negotiations with the Soviet Union in the years 1990 and 1991, and Russia, being the legal successor to the USSR, without any major obstructions or procrastination agreed to signing new bilateral treaties still in the year 1992, of course, without Kvitsinsky's “security clauses”. In January 1992, the essential treaty was sig-

ned with Poland, in April 1992 with the Czechoslovak Federation, and in November 1992 with Hungary. In the treaties, the signatories dissociated themselves from the Soviet past and expressed their predominant interest in the development of mutually convenient economic cooperation. The Visegrád countries at the summit in Krakow in October 1991 undertook, among other things, to proceed with the coordination of their respective policies in relation to the Soviet Union, and they abided to the attitude in practice when signing new treaties with Russia. A new situation emerged after the disintegration of the Czechoslovak federation on 1st January, 1993, with the Czech Republic (CR) and the Slovak Republic (SR) having emerged. A need arose to sign new bilateral treaties with Russia which would replace the principal Czechoslovak treaty of April 1992, this being *already under the circumstances of the new Russian policy toward the CEE countries having been formulated*.

Russia signed new treaties with the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in August 1993. During the negotiations on a new treaty with Russia, Slovakia did not coordinate its steps with the Czech Republic, whereby the principle of coordination of foreign policy within the Visegrád group was disturbed for the first time. The Russian foreign policy, implemented in accordance with the Kozyrev doctrine, acquired thus for the first time a chance to achieve diplomatic success and, in a way, to find in the case of Slovakia a "weak link" of the Visegrád group. The debate in Slovakia in relation to signing the treaty with Russia reached white heat.

Security consequences following for Slovakia from the text of the basic treaty with Russia have been summed up by the then Director of the Slovak Institute of International Studies, Svetoslav Bombík, in a way as follows: "In the field of foreign policy and security, the treaty forces Slovakia to accept the Russian ideas on the way of building up the European political and security architecture (...). This concept makes it more difficult for us to try and accede to the Western security structures, mainly the WEU, but to NATO as well (...). It is systemically included within the remaining articles, containing such formulations like "signatories to this treaty hereby confirm that the security of Europe (...) is connected with the CSCE", they shall "assist in the creation of a unified all-European space in all of its dimensions", they shall "jointly and individually face any respective attempts to once again divide Europe in the economic and social spheres", they shall "develop" mutually convenient cooperation and contacts in the military sphere" (...). This text clearly forces Slovakia to join its own security exclusively with the "all-European" process of CSCE."

President of the Slovak Republic, Michal Kováč, interpreted the contents of the signed treaty in a different manner. Immediately after signing the political treaty, he declared in the spirit of the Kozyrev doctrine: "The treaty proclaims an endeavor of both signatories to cooperate in creating the all-European economic, political, and security structures... the treaty proclaims an endeavor of both signatories to cooperate in creating the all-European security system and to face the efforts to divide Europe in economic and social spheres into two camps." He also added: "The treaty is not in conflict with the endeavor of the SR to accede to the European economic, political, and security structures." Less than three months later after signing the treaty, President Kováč, having learned his lesson from the sanguinary crisis in Moscow (October 1993), was much more realistic in giving his opinion: "From the time of the sanguinary attempt at coup in Moscow, Bratislava considers it inevitable to obtain from NATO security-political guarantees. Unless the democratic conditions in Russia and Ukraine are reinforced, the need for increasing security remains topical." However, in the meantime Slovakia has avowed not to prefer "regional" security structures (according to the MFA RF definition, NATO belongs among these) in the political treaty with the Russian Federation.

Yuriy Ambartsumov, the then Chairperson of the Foreign Committee of Russian Parliament, during his visit to Bratislava in September 1993, drew attention to an unambiguous interpretation of the treaty with immediate consequences on the security policy of the SR, when reacting on the statement of the MFA SR spokesman saying that the aim of the SR is accession to NATO. In the former's opinion, the treaty excludes a possibility that the SR becomes a member of "any regional pact, NATO included, as we consider it as a such". Lack of experience in diplomacy on the part of Bratislava in this specific case may be convincingly illustrated by comparing it to the Czech-Russian treaty, which had been signed very shortly before the Slovak-Russian one. Both SR and CR in signing new treaties departed from the identical text of the principal treaty between ČSFR and RF of April 1992. "The Czechs were successful in burying the Kozyrev doctrine implicitly contained in Article 11 (of the principal treaty – author's note), having changed the formulation "to face a new division of Europe" into "contribute to overcoming the division of Europe" (...). By the change of terms, the Czechs neutralized any possible Russian objections against the accession of the CR to NATO which could follow from the treaty."

In other words, Russian diplomacy, conducted in the spirit of the Kozyrev doctrine, managed to gain its first diplomatic success in case of Slovakia.

The Slovak-Russian relations, thanks also to that success, began to develop in other directions than those between Russia and the remaining Visegrád countries.

Russian crisis of 1993 and its consequences for foreign policy

A gradual change in the "Russocentrist" American policy may be observed from the end of the year 1993 in consequence of internal dramatic events in Moscow in September and October 1993, when President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency, and with the military support of the army he quelled the opposition Parliament. After the adoption of the new constitution in the referendum of 12th December 1993, the authoritarian presidential regime was introduced in Russia (with the Parliament playing merely a marginal role). On top of that, the radical nationalistic LDPR of V. Zhirinovskiy won the parliamentary elections. This showed that Russia was unable within a foreseeable period of time to proceed in its transformation in such a manner as to become, from the viewpoint of values and interests, a fully compatible part of the West. Democracy in Russia had to defend itself by extremely undemocratic means. The task and the possibilities of Kozyrev's Ministry in formulating and implementing foreign policy of the RF after the autumn of 1993 were diminished in a principal way. The leaders of the so-called power sectors won a much larger space in the creation of the Russian policy than had been the case in the years 1992 and 1993. The letter from President Yeltsin to the heads of Western countries of 30th September, 1993 became the first signal of a significant shift in foreign policy. In the letter, the President rejected the plans to enlarge NATO by the CEE countries and suggested instead that the security of those countries be guaranteed jointly by NATO and Russia.

Within the above period of time, which substantially influenced further development of domestic and foreign policy of the RF, a new military doctrine was approved. The last one indicated a qualitatively new direction of the Russian attitude to both its own and European security. The work on the text of the military doctrine was completed on 6th October 1993, two days after having shot to pieces the seat of the Russian Parliament. On 2nd November 1993, the Security Council of the RF approved the text of the document, and pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 1833 of the same date the military doctrine became effective. Of course, it was not the Parliament who discussed and decided on the approval of the military doctrine (which usually is part of good manners in democratic states), since the Parliament was shot to pieces at that time and the new one was elected as late as on 12th Decem-

ber, but the National Security Council, consisting predominantly of the leaders of the so-called power sectors.

The new military doctrine is characterized in the Introduction as a "document of the period of transition – the period of determining the Russian statehood (...), *of forming a new system of international relations*" (italics mine). The aim of the policy of the Russian Federation in the period of transition in the sphere of nuclear weapons is the "removal of the danger of nuclear war through refraining from aggression against the RF and its allies". This means that the aim is not nuclear disarmament but nuclear balance or, respectively, nuclear umbrella which Russia offers to itself and to its allies. No doubt such formulation of the aims of the nuclear policy sets before the CEE countries an acute security dilemma: either attempt at accession to NATO or obtain nuclear guarantees for its own security, or accept the offer from Russia to become its allies. Russia gave up the Soviet principle of not using nuclear weapons at first, on the contrary, in the new doctrine it defines in a negative way against whom these may be used. The use of nuclear weapons of RF is possible, according to the doctrine, among the cases, also in case of "the defense of sovereignty against Russia or its allies" (...) and the like, but also "in case of enlargement of military blocks and alliances at the expense of military security of RF." This last instance directly responds to the endeavors of the CEE countries to become NATO members.

The military doctrine of RF does not leave out the infrastructure implementing the new military-political aims: "Russian Federation attributes predominant significance to the renewal and extension of cooperation of businesses and trade scientific-research institutes on the basis of mutual convenience, which form the defense-industrial potential of the CIS member states." The development of military cooperation is presupposed in the doctrine also with the CEE countries, which in this sense are equal to the CIS states. The text says to the letter: "The development of mutually convenient cooperation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the states of Central and East Europe." In the text of the document, explicitly given are the CIS and CEE countries, all of the other countries of the world are given in the text as "other". The Russian military-industrial complex has been shown a "green light" from the state administration and the newly formulated needs of security and vital interests of Russia require its revitalization, making the dynamism of development more rapid, they even presuppose its "world-wide leading position".

After the Russian autumn of 1993, the discussion of NATO enlargement acquired a qualitatively new dimension since the world has already been

acquainted with a "new Russia". In January 1994, on the NATO summit, the program Partnership for Peace was adopted which created a framework for a realistic military-political dialogue between the Alliance and applicants for membership. The President of the USA, Bill Clinton, declared at the summit that the issue of NATO enlargement is not one of "whether" but "when". The State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, reflecting on the American policy in relation to Russia in 1992 and 1993 noted that "the greatest mistake that both Bush and Clinton administrations made in relation to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union had been remaining for a much too extended period of time on Russocentrist positions, instead of developing important relations with Ukraine and other republics". In other words, Kozyrev failed to achieve his main aim: to renew strategic positions of Russia in the world policy, including its position in Europe, in its role of a close ally and strategic partner of the United States. However, in defense of Kozyrev it should be said that the essential feature of his failure was not rooted in his lack of diplomatic competence, but predominantly in the domestic development of Russia, which culminated in autumn 1993. After autumn 1993, the main word in formulating the foreign policy of RF did no longer belong to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to the power structures, which had supported Yeltsin in his domestic struggle with opposition, especially to the Ministry of Defense headed by Pavel Grachov.

The years 1994 and 1995 were not successful for the implementation of Kozyrev's doctrine in relation to the CEE countries despite that fact that Slovakia fell out of the first wave of integration within Western structures. Russia failed to stop the process of NATO enlargement and enforce its own vision of European security and parallel getting closer to the Western structures along with the CEE countries. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives could hardly hide their disappointment over the policy of the United States toward "new Russia" in Europe, which found its fullest expression in their bitter rhetoric. In reaction to the publication of Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995 which, among other things, admitted the need in relation to Russia to take into consideration geopolitical changes in Europe and to amend the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE) of 1990, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikolay Afanasyevsky, stated: "We strictly reject the NATO study on the future enlargement of the Alliance eastward in exchange for amending the Conventional Arms Treaty in Europe in favor of Russia." The disappointed Kozyrev added: "Russia may not accept any treaty in exchange for NATO enlargement. We reject the NATO enlargement, and this is why there cannot be any trading on this issue."

A good diplomat, however, cannot ever afford saying “never any treaty”. Kozyrev’s removal from the post of the Minister toward the end of 1995 was only a question of time. In January 1996 he was replaced by the then head of Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeniy Primakov, who, what Kozyrev principally had rejected, turned into the main object of “trade” in the negotiations with NATO on enlargement eastward.

Russian Foreign Policy under Primakov

Primakov’s policy is in two fields – post-Soviet territory and Central Europe – fully comparable with what has been formulated and what the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been striving for during his predecessor. There, however, does exist at least two principal differences (one in the domestic position and the other one in global strategy) between the first two Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation under post-Soviet conditions:

1. Primakov was able to regain for his field of operation what Kozyrev had lost after the autumn of 1993 – he renewed the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in making Russian foreign policy. After the presidential elections in 1996, two major events happened in this respect: 1. Those representatives of power structures had been revoked from the Government and the nearest vicinity of the President, who reached the peak of Russian politics in autumn 1993, headed by Generals Pavel Grachov and Alexander Korzhakov; 2. A new coordinating body was formed for the President, entitled Foreign Policy Council, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeniy Primakov. The latter commented on this fact as follows: “My Ministry has gained effective control over making foreign policy.”
2. Both Kozyrev and Primakov shared a joint aim in foreign policy: to re-establish the position of Russia in world policy which could be comparable to the previous position of the Soviet Union. However, the principal difference between them remains in their understanding of achieving the aim. Whereas Kozyrev saw the aim in establishing strategic partnership with the United States, Primakov recognized the very opposite: “Russia must become an active actor of international doings in the whole world – Middle East, Asia, and anywhere else – just like it was toward the end of the Soviet era. Russian foreign policy must defend Russian national interests and face the development of international relations in direction to forming a unipolar world under the command of the USA.”

Primakov's policy departed from the thesis that even though Russia may not achieve the topical leading position of the United States in the world policy, it still may contribute significantly to the creation of the so called multipolar world which will reinstall Russia in the position of one of the centers of world policy. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs includes among the countries which should contribute to the division of world power the following: European Union, China, Japan, ASEAN (South-East Asia), Latin America, and, of course, the United States and Russia (including CIS). Primakov's version of the multipolar world for which he managed to gain almost absolute support at home – unlike his predecessor who failed to gain such support for the strategic development of the relations with the USA – served as the justification for the policy of approaching Russia with China, Iran, and Iraq during the course of the year 1996. In the opinion of Ariel Cohen, Primakov's policy represents a challenge for the United States in at least two strategically important areas – the Persian Gulf and Taiwan Straits. Besides, "Primakov is trying to achieve exclusive position on Russia at the Kavkaz and in Central Asia, supports the inevitability of the CIS countries integration with Russia, he is a proponent of the union with Belarus, and enforces the use of power in the former USSR region". In Cohen's view, the Primakov doctrine might be defined as a "policy attempt in decreasing the power and influence of the United States and, while simultaneously increasing the power and influence of Russia in the Central East and Eurasia".

One of the aims of the offensive opened at all critical places and issues of world policy was – among other things – to prepare for Primakov better positions for negotiating with NATO on its enlargement into Central Europe. Toward the close of his career, Kozyrev had become unable even to negotiate this issue, but Primakov proved to be a much more realistic strategist. It cannot be claimed that NATO in the person of Primakov had not welcomed this change in the Russian attitude, at least in the question of Central Europe, since NATO indeed wanted and needed to reach agreements with Russia. In Primakov's view, there exist two main issues of tension in the relations to the West: NATO enlargement and the attitude of the West to integration processes within the CIS. Primakov's "Central-European" policy was, therefore, in the years 1996-1997 predominantly concentrated on the issue of NATO enlargement.

Russian arsenal of retaliation steps

In the years 1996 and 1997 Russia demonstrated – fully in accordance with the Primakov doctrine – what it is able to do in case the NATO enlarge-

ment shall be a unilateral procedure or, respectively, the Russian requirements are not complied with. One may specify at least ten spheres or foreign-policy and security issues in which Russia has undertaken specific steps, or tried to make use of them as tools of preventive determent.

1. *Unilateral revision of performing the liabilities following from the START 1 and START 2 Treaties on decreasing the number of warheads*; even during the visit of US Minister of Defense, William Perry, in Moscow in April 1995, the Chairperson of the Council of Federation (upper chamber of the Parliament of RF), Vladimir Shumeyko, for the first time clearly communicated to the American side that if NATO is enlarged, the Russian Parliament shall not ratify START 2 as a treaty not corresponding to security interests of Russia. Moreover, in January 1996, the then Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachov, admitted that Russia might revise even START 1 treaty. The fact is that the American Congress ratified START 2 in January 1997, whereas the Russian Parliament did not do so even in the middle of the year 1998. Contrary to that, Russia approached the United States with the request for a five-year postponement of the implementation of START 2 treaty. The threat of non-ratifying START 2, or unilateral revision of the obligations following for Russia from START 1, belonged among the arguments of the heaviest caliber of Moscow in the negotiations concerning NATO enlargement.

2. *Termination of withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Western border of Russia and increasing their number on the territory of Belarus*; this possibility was admitted in October 1996 by Grachov's successor to the post of the Minister of Defense of RF, Igor Rodionov. Despite the fact that the process of integration of Russia and Belarus continues slowly within the framework of creating a union (the treaty was signed in April 1996) – especially in political and economic fields, in the field of military cooperation marks quite a realistic progress. On 2nd April, 1997, the Supreme Council of the Commonwealth of RF and Belarus adopted the “General Principles of building the armed forces of Belarus and Russian Federation and making use of the military infrastructure”. Simplification of legislation was agreed, implementation of common programs in the formation of armies, the creation of the system of joint command, etc. The work on the elaboration of the joint military doctrine continues, the air defense troops jointly defend and monitor the air space, and the Russian leaders do not conceal the fact that the formation of a military-political union with Belarus – to which other post-Soviet states should gradually accede - is motivated by the very fact of NATO enlargement eastward.

3. *Revision of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)*; Russia is prepared to unilaterally revise its liabilities following from CFE, if its require-

ments to change the limits of conventional weapons in its favor are not observed. This requirement of Moscow has undergone a certain development. As early as in 1993, Russia asked that the effectiveness of the regulation of the so-called flank limitations be terminated, according to which in the areas of contact of the NATO countries and the former Warsaw Treaty countries only limited numbers of conventional armaments are permitted. The requirement from Russia was predominantly motivated by the development of the situation of crisis in the Northern Kavkaz. In June 1995, Russia increased its requirements in such a manner that there is need to take into account the changes after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, and also the fact that CFE no longer correspond to the security interests of RF. One should here note that the Study on NATO Enlargement of 1995 indicated a possible agreement of NATO with this requirement. In April 1997, Russia once again asked for extensive revision of CFE, by which it conditioned its agreement with NATO enlargement.

4. *A threat of destabilization of Russian armed forces as a threat of destabilization of the security of Europe*, this intimidating argument was formulated at the turn of the years 1996 and 1997 by the minister of Defense of RF, I. Rodionov. In other words, the Russian military élite indicated that in case of the military isolation of Russia and refusal to provide financial assistance to the RF forces from the NATO countries, their destabilization may occur, as well as the emergence of violence temptations among officers which, consequently, may cause a loss of control in the Russian Army generally, and the control over the immense Russian nuclear potential especially. This argument had already had a character of direct blackmailing.

5. *The development of military and technological cooperation with Iran*; Russia rejected the protest of the United States against the deliveries of nuclear capacities to Iran. Russian Premier Victor Chernomyrdin rejected the cancellation of the signed treaty with Iran on this issue as early as in 1995. Moreover, the United States have a justified suspicion that Russian arms get into Iran through China. The Russian side made no exceptional endeavors to convince the American one of the opposite, at least in the process of negotiations on NATO enlargement in the first half of the year 1997.

6. *The development of relations of strategic partnership with China*; in December 1996, after long years of tense relations, an historical visit of Chinese Premier Li Pcheng took place in Moscow. In the joint communiqué, of the Premiers, both Russia and China denounced the NATO enlargement eastward and expressed themselves in favor of building a multipolar world. A treaty was signed on the deliveries of Russian military aircraft Su-27 to

China, as well their manufacture under Russian license. Russia manifested a great welcoming attitude toward China and expressed its readiness for the demarcation of the joint 4300 kms long border, which was subject to many years of contentions. In April 1997, President Yeltsin visited China, which followed immediately after the so called March American-Russian summit in Helsinki which was devoted to the negotiations on the NATO enlargement.

7. *Independent political line in the areas of crisis immediately related to the security of Europe: the Balkans and the Near East*; Primakov demonstrated on several occasions the readiness of Russia to enforce its own political line - opposing to the policy of the United States - in long-years centers of tension which are subject to security interests of the USA, EU, and NATO. Russia raised a sharp protest against the intervention of the British SFOR troops in detaining the Serbian war criminals provided "nothing similar ever again happens". Russia once again started to exert endeavors to reestablish the relations with anti-America disposed circles of Arabic countries, it manifested its readiness to become mediator in settling the conflicts in the Near East, it interfered effectively in a diplomatic way in averting the military attack of Western allies against Iraq in the year 1997.

8. *An offer of security guarantees to the Baltic states and Slovakia*; Russia offered or, respectively, agreed to offering security guarantees during the year 1997 to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia in case they do not become the NATO members or decide for neutrality. Russia had not even excluded the United States or NATO joining the treaty on mutual safeguarding the security of those Central European countries, which do not become NATO members in the first wave. In other words, the suggestion of President Yeltsin of September 1993 was repeated, this time under new circumstances and in a new form. In the former, it was a group offer, in the latter a bilateral one. The Baltic countries unambiguously rejected the Russian security offer, but not so Slovakia. The United States took up an attitude of rejection toward the Russian proposal to solve the position of the CEE countries saying they provide the guarantees merely to its allies. In any case, Russia demonstrated that it was ready to be looking for their own allies in Central Europe among the anticipated NATO non-membership countries and that it wishes to preserve the role of a security actor within the region or, respectively, a kind of balance having a direct influence.

9. *The development of economic relations with the Central European countries with the aim of preserving the Russian influence in the region and the threat of economic sanctions*; in February 1997, two conceptual materials were published: 1. The Line of Russian Federation in Developing Relations with the

Baltic States (RF President Administration); 2. Central and Eastern Europe and Interests of Russia (Council on Foreign and Security Policy, The Fund on the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia). The materials contained a complex analysis of Russian interests in both of the key regions of Central Europe and the possibilities of increasing the economic influence of Russia in these countries. The authors of both documents departed from the need of a so called "asymmetric reply" of Russia to the NATO's military expansion from the East. The reply should rest in the economic expansion of Russia westward, first of all, to the Central European region. In other words, the countries, which reject the membership in NATO, should enjoy advantages in the economic relations with Russia, and vice versa. The argument on economic sanctions – in case of heading for NATO – was publicly employed in March 1997 by the ambassadors of RF to the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. On the conference "Slovakia and NATO" in Bratislava on 5th March, 1997, Ambassador of RF to Slovakia Sergey Zotov, inter alia, said: "The question is whether Russia will be able to develop business relations with East Europe regardless of the nature of military preparations on the territory of new NATO members. To act as if one was separable from the other one means to consciously pretend and build the economic cooperation between Russia and East Europe on rotten foundations, mainly if we have possibilities to purchase similar goods in the West."

10. *Enforcement of a policy of Russia's bilateral relations with key European countries at the expense of the relations with NATO*; the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Primakov, stressed that in case of not taking into account Russian interests in the issue of NATO enlargement, Moscow may in a considerable way reduce its relations with the Alliance and choose as its chief partners in the dialogue on European security key European countries – France and Germany. In other words, Moscow might attempt at composing a new "European concert", in which the first violin would be played by the traditional European super powers. Such policy could gradually lead to erosion of Western integration structures and force the United States out of the Continent. It was upon the explicit condition from the Russian part that the Founding Act between Russia and NATO was finally signed in the capital of France, the country which for quite a time has been in contention with the USA within NATO concerning the command of the so called Southern flank of the Alliance and several times so far has taken a standpoint of opposition to that of the USA and closer to the one of Moscow. In Primakov's view, "Russia has already found common language with many in Europe who no longer wish to blindly follow the American line".

The demonstrated arsenal of possible retaliation measures from the part of Russia in the years 1996-1997 documented that Primakov and "his Russian foreign policy" were really very well prepared for the negotiations with NATO and that they would not sell the positions of Russia so cheap, unlike Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in the beginning of the 1990s. NATO Council on the level of ministers of foreign affairs decided in December 1996 that "the summit of NATO on the level of heads of state in Madrid shall invite one or more countries which showed interest to join the Alliance to commence the talks on accession". At the same time it empowered Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, to negotiate with RF to enter into agreement before the Madrid summit on 8th and 9th July 1997. In the period between January – May 1997, six rounds of negotiations talks took place between Solana and Primakov, which were a success, according to the statements from both of the respective parts. On 14th May 1997 an agreement was reached concerning the text of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia.

What was it in fact that Russia agreed on with NATO, how high was the "Russian price" for the enlargement of NATO and what may the CEE region expect from this historic act?

Russian claims

During the negotiations with NATO Russia insisted on satisfying ten essential requirements, which may be divided into three main groups: those of formal-legal, military-political, and economic character.

First of all, Russia claimed that the document regulating the relations between Russia and NATO formally had a binding character from the legal point of view. In Primakov's words: "Russia may no longer rely on oral promises and declarations of Western leaders. The dialogue must be put down in writing. Many a time they kept telling us one thing and then something different happened." The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gennadiy Tarasov, explained Russian worries in this sense after the first round of Solana - Primakov talks in January 1997: "Moscow has from the very beginning considered the plans to enlarge NATO a breach of the unwritten agreement of the beginning of the 1990s when the then Soviet troops left the territories of ČSFR, GDR, and other Soviet satellites without Moscow demanding that a legally binding agreement be signed which would prevent the presence of NATO troops in those countries." The legally binding agreement with NATO should have been, in the original Russian ideas, ratified by the parliaments of all of the 16 member states and by the Parliament of RF.

Only then the accession of new members to NATO should have become topical.

Six key military-political demands were of decisive importance for the development of negotiations: 1) Russia shall have right of veto in the decision making of NATO concerning serious issues pertaining to European security; 2) the first wave of NATO enlargement shall at the same time be the last one; 3) NATO shall not deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member countries; 4) precise limitations shall be defined for the number of NATO operational troops in new member countries; 5) limits shall be set for making use of the military infrastructure of new member countries for the activities of NATO; 6) essential revision of the Conventional Forces Treaty (CFE) or, respectively, preparation and signing of CFE 2 prior to NATO enlargement, which revision will consider security interests of Russia under new conditions. During the negotiations, Russia added to the above military-political demands also those of economic character: 1) membership of Russia in the G7 group or, later, the G8; 2) membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would enable avoiding of limitations for the exportation of Russian production; 3) membership in the Paris Club of Creditors, which would enable the emergence of the RF claim to return the old Soviet credits offered to the former third world countries.

Before the first round of talks with J. Solana, Primakov indicated what he considered crucial for reaching a compromise: "We depart from the fact that the main measure of credibility of our NATO partners shall be their readiness to take into awareness our concerns on our own security. If we are able to agree on the modernization of the CFE in such a manner that the most reliable, i.e. material, guarantees of mutual European security were provided, then we shall be ready to sign a corresponding document on special relations with NATO." German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who visited Moscow in January 1997 admitted "an agreement could be made with Moscow on NATO enlargement if Russia and Ukraine were granted reasonable compensations. I have every reason to assume that thanks to a coordinated attitude reasonable compensations could be achieved". Kohl has not been any more specific on what he understands under "reasonable compensations", whether it concerned merely what Primakov had indicated in relation to the CFE revision, or Russian demands of economic character were also included. In any case, it was clear that *a compromise must be achieved*.

The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary – the most probable candidates to join the Alliance - showed during the negotiations their concerns predominantly on the Russian claims of military – political character. Accepta-

tion of Russian claims would mean that their membership in NATO would only be one of "second category". In April 1997 negotiations were held in Washington between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the CR, J. Zielenec with the head of American diplomacy, Madelaine Allbright who assured her Czech colleague that "NATO will not admit any negotiations or solutions which would bypass the backs of the new member countries and that the agreement with Russia might decrease their defense capacities or touch upon their sovereignty". NATO indeed did not yield to Russia, at least as concerns the first invited member countries, CR, Poland, and Hungary.

Secretary General of NATO, Solana, considered this fact one of the major successes of the negotiations with Primakov: "We have found out that we can achieve simultaneously – first-rate new members of NATO as well as the transformed relations with Russia." On the other hand, Primakov commented on the outcomes of the negotiations as follows: "On our level, we have achieved full understanding in all of the aspects of the document, including those military-political" The spokesman of the Russian President, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, also welcomed the outcomes of negotiations: "A number of guarantees have been included within the document which to a large measure put limitations on minimizing the negative influence of NATO enlargement on the national interests of Russia."

After these statements on both parts, a question arises, what it in fact was that NATO and Russia agreed on and how such an agreement may influence further process of NATO enlargement or the development of international situation in Europe and in the CEE region?

The compromise achieved and its consequences for Central Europe

What were the Russian claims and to what degree were they satisfied? Let us attempt at their brief summing up.

First of all, Russia failed to enforce signing of the classical international treaty, which would contain particularized formulations of conditions, obligations, and rights, precise specification of the period of effectiveness, etc. On the other side, NATO has not achieved what it originally wanted – adoption of merely a common declarative document in form of a Charter. A compromise was reached by adopting the Founding Act, which had been inspired by the form of the Helsinki Act of 1975. The Act shall not be subject to ratification by the parliaments of the NATO membership countries, although the Russian signatory did not exclude that this might happen in case of the Russian parliament. The binding character of the regulations of the Founding

ding Act was confirmed by the signatures of the Heads of State and Government of 16 NATO member countries and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 27th May, 1997, in Paris, like it similarly happened in Helsinki in the year 1975. Not to speak of the fact that behind the signed heads of states on both sides stand the largest military groupings of contemporary Europe, which in itself is a sufficient guarantee of the Treaty.

Russia did not obtain the right of veto of the NATO decisions pertaining to the issues of European security. In the text, the following is given word by word: "The regulations of this Act do not in any case grant to NATO or Russia the right of veto on the performance of either party, nor any limitation of the right of NATO or Russia to take decisions and exert activities independently follow from these." On the other hand, the entire part II of the Act wording gives a detailed schedule of consultations, establishment and operation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council which guarantees to Russia, at least, consulting participation in the decision-making on the issues of European security of those admitted by NATO. Javier Solana expressed this precisely, stating: "Russia shall not be able to block NATO's own decisions. However, Russia may expect that NATO shall seriously hear and take into consideration its legitimate interests."

Russia also failed to obtain from NATO an explicitly formulated obligation that the first wave of NATO enlargement should also be the last. Contrary to that, in the text of the Act, the issue of further NATO enlargement is as a matter of fact not being mentioned directly. The Madrid Declaration of NATO, which followed the signing of the Act, declares in Article 8: "We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Those countries that have expressed an interest in membership, however have not been invited to commence the accession talks today, remain in consideration for membership in the future. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership (...)." However, the second half of this sentence reads as follows: "(...) and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability". In other words, the Madrid Declaration contains no passage, which would explicitly, state that the process of NATO enlargement will inevitably and really continue. The same Article contains also the following sentence: "(...) in order to enhance overall security and stability in Europe, further steps in the ongoing enlargement process of the Alliance should balance the security concerns of all Allies." The Madrid Dec-

laration is in the issue of further NATO enlargement influenced much more by the regulations on All-European security than is the NATO Council decision of December 1996 saying “clearly” that the first countries shall be invited on the Madrid summit in July 1997. Behind this “spirit and style of formulations” of the Madrid Declaration one may recognize a considerable influence of half-year negotiations with Russia and the text of the Founding Act. In other words, one should not forget that all of the decisions of NATO – including, and maybe predominantly, the issues of further enlargement of the Alliance – shall not be made without a much more expressive consulting presence of Russia than was the case in the previous period. Article 11 of the Madrid Declaration states: “The Founding Act reflects our (of Russia and NATO) shared commitment to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.”

Avowal of the Alliance to the obligations not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members may be included within the successes of Russian diplomacy: “NATO membership countries reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.” A not so unambiguous success, at least as concerns direct formulations in the text of the Founding Act, achieved by Russia in its claims to set limitations on the NATO operational troops and making use of the existing military infrastructure in new member states. True, Russia did not reach setting their precise limits, it, however, achieved definitions of its conditions: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defense against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures.”

It should be stressed that the greatest satisfaction on the Russian part was evoked by the adoption of the joint obligation to substantially revise the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which would consider a new security situation in Europe, including the existence of the enlarged NATO.

As has been mentioned, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Primakov, prior to the commencement of talks in January 1997 conditioned by this fact any possible agreement of Russia to sign treaties with NATO. During the visit of Madeleine Allbright in Moscow in the beginning of May 1997, the parties agreed that they undertake *to solve any remaining problems through CFE modernization* (italics mine). In this relation, M. Allbright expressed a view that "USA yielded to Russia in everything in what it was possible to yield".

In other words, by the CFE revision Russia follows two principal aims at one time. First of all, decreasing the limits in the number of conventional forces specifically for each of the European countries which would mean that NATO should not be allowed to deploy in these new member states any significant military force. In the agreement on the limits for conventional forces for CR, Poland, and Hungary, precise limits for deploying "alien" (i.e. NATO) troops on their territories could be set in this way. Next, considering the fact that NATO, unlike WT, continues in its existence, Moscow wants in the CFE revision to preserve the limits of conventional forces for "groups of states". In such case, any further NATO enlargement in new countries would become questionable. Accession of any further country would automatically presuppose further CFE revision. Should the opposite case occur, every new NATO member would have to substantially limit the number of their conventional forces which, of course, would inevitably decrease their capacity to contribute to the Alliance defense potential and, of course, the interest of the Alliance in such a member. The Founding Act indicates what direction the CFE revision should take: "The member States of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty."

The largest part of the passage of part IV of the Founding Act is devoted to the issue of CFE adaptation dealing with military-political matters. Russia managed to interweave in the text the anticipated CFE revision with the elaboration of the Joint and General Security Model for Europe in the 21st century in the loft of OSCE, which was agreed at the Lisbon OSCE assessment conference in December 1996. In other words, Russian diplomacy succeeded in having indirectly placed the issue, through the CFE revision, on any future NATO enlargement into the OSCE agenda, which had been its long-time aim. According to the Founding Act, the negotiations on the conventional forces shall constitute one of the major issues (the text specifies 19 such issues altogether) of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. NATO avowed to the commit-

ment to prepare a new framework treaty on the new CFE adaptation also in Article 24 of the Madrid Declaration. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of RF, Primakov, declared immediately after signing the Act: "We believe that the practical implementation of the Founding Act will help to reinforce security in Europe. It will be shown in the near future whether our optimism is justified. I have in mind the ongoing negotiations in Vienna on the adaptation of CFE to the new post-confrontational situation in Europe."

In other words, the talks between Russia and NATO on the latter's enlargement eastward have not been finished by signing the Founding Act and go on in the negotiations on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. Signing of the Founding Act cannot be taken as a clear victory of diplomacy of either party. There do exist, however, some essential facts which speak in favor of Russian diplomacy – *from the viewpoint of those CEE countries which will not become NATO members in the first wave* – despite the fact that it has not achieved satisfaction of all of its claims in signing the Founding Act. NATO did manage to obtain an "indirect" agreement from Russia with the first wave of enlargement, however, it was met half-way with the global Russian claims which return Russia, on a qualitatively new level, into the security agenda of Europe after the cold war and the dissolution of the USSR. Further enlargement of NATO, if any, shall take place in a much more interwoven structure of security commitments than has been the case so far. Besides, Primakov managed to separate in the Founding Act the NATO-Russia relations in Europe from those between USA and Russia in the world. In other words, the Founding Act does not force the Russian foreign policy to change, under his guidance, the content of the enforced foreign doctrine, as Primakov had demonstrated it successfully in the years 1996 and 1997. This is supported also by the text of the National Security Concept of Russian Federation approved half a year after signing the Founding Act: "The formation of a multipolar world shall be a long-time process. The present stage is still characteristic of strong relapses of attempts to create a structure of international relations based on the unilateral, including military, solutions of key problems of world policy (...). The perspective of NATO enlargement eastward is unacceptable for Russia, since it represents a threat for its national security."

As a consequence of the anticipated enlargement of NATO, the European security architecture shall not be based on the hierarchized system on the basis of CSCE, but will have a pluralistic character – of the institutions existing side by side. The NATO Madrid summit of July 1997, as well as the EU summit in Luxembourg in December 1997 adopted a decision to enlarge eastward. This is the way in which a significant stage of forming a new architecture of

Europe is being finished after the cold war. In the same manner, a significant stage of the Russian foreign policy has been finished in relation to the CEE countries, which has been developing predominantly against the background of the relations with the West. In the new situation one may expect an increase of realistic elements and a much greater variability of both individual and regional attitude in the foreign policy of Russia toward the post-Soviet area, Europe, and the CEE region. What tools may the Russian foreign policy make use of under new conditions and what are the perspectives of the development of the relations between Russia and the CEE countries?

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Resumé:

Alexander Duleba: *Rusko, stredná Európa a rozširovanie NATO*

Kozyrevova doktrína

Na rozpad východného bloku, Sovietskeho zväzu a na ukončenie bipolárneho konfliktu muselo Rusko reagovať v zásadne zmenených geopolitických podmienkach. Podstatu zahraničnej politiky prvého ministra zahranič-

ných vecí RF Andreja Kozyreva vo vzťahu k strednej Európe by bolo možné zhrnúť nasledovne: Rusko sa musí vyhnúť medzinárodnej izolácii; môže sa jej vyhnúť iba tak, že sa bude približovať k bezpečnostným štruktúram Západu paralelne s krajinami strednej Európy; v tomto procese nesmie byť dopustená prednosť krajín SVE; zároveň je potrebné presadiť vytvorenie paneurópskeho bezpečnostného systému v priestore od Atlantiku po Ural, ktorému bude podriadené NATO, ako i princíp, že Rusko musí byť integrálnou súčasťou akéhokoľvek inštitucionalizovaného bezpečnostného systému v Európe. Vývoj medzinárodnej situácie, ktorý nebude v súlade s týmito zásadami, bude znamenať nové rozdelenie a konfrontáciu v Európe.

Kozyrevova zahraničná politika vychádzala zároveň z presvedčenia, že Rusko bude schopné znova postupne získať štatút svetovej veľmoci, opierajúc sa o strategické partnerstvo so Spojenými štátmi americkými. Rusko zostávalo jadrovou veľmocou a bolo presvedčené, že Spojené štáty budú potrebovať v Európe silné a stabilné Rusko pokračujúce na ceste demokratických reforiem, ktoré bude schopné byť reálnym partnerom, prinajmenšom v procese a kontrole medzinárodného odzbrojenia a v perspektíve i globálnej bezpečnosti. Politika Bushovej i Clintonovej administrácie bola v uvedenom období skutočne rusocentrická a diskusia o rozširovaní NATO smerom na východ sa viedla viac v diplomatických a expertných kuloároch, než bola predmetom reálnej politiky. Spojené štáty tým, že vyvíjali nátlak na Ukrajinu, Kazachstan a Bielorusko v súvislosti s odovzdaním jadrových hlavíc Rusku na základe Lisabonského protokolu k zmluve START 1 z roku 1992, utvrďovali Moskvu v presvedčení o správnosti zvolenej zahraničnej línie.

Dôsledky ruskej krízy 1993 pre zahraničnú politiku a proces rozširovania NATO

Postupnú zmenu v „rusocentrickej“ americkej politike je možné badať od konca roku 1993 v dôsledku vnútorných dramatických udalostí v Moskve v septembri-októbri 1993, keď prezident Jelcin vyhlásil výnimočný stav a s ozbrojenou podporou armády potlačil opozičný parlament. V Rusku –po prijatí novej ústavy v referende 12. decembra 1993 – bol nastolený autokratický prezidentský režim (s marginálnou úlohou parlamentu). Parlamentné voľby vyhrala radikálne nacionalistická LDSR Vladimíra Žirinovského. Ukázalo sa, že Rusko nie je schopné v transformácii napredovať takým spôsobom, aby sa v strednodobom výhľade stalo plne hodnotovo i záujmovo kompatibilnou súčasťou Západu. Demokracia v Rusku sa musela brániť krajne nedemokratickými prostriedkami. Úloha a možnosti Kozyrevovho minis-

terstva pri formulovaní a realizovaní zahraničnej politiky RF po jeseni 1993 sa zásadným spôsobom zmenšili. Oveľa väčší priestor v tvorbe ruskej zahraničnej politiky, než tomu bolo v rokoch 1992-1993, získali predstavitelia tzv. silových rezortov. Prvým signálom významného posunu v zahraničnej politike sa stal list prezidenta Jelcina hlavám západných krajín z 30. septembra 1993, v ktorom zásadne odmietol plány na rozširovanie NATO o krajiny SVE a namiesto toho navrhol, aby bezpečnosť krajín SVE bola garantovaná spoločne NATO a Ruskom. V uvedenom období, ktoré podstatne ovplyvnilo ďalší vývoj vnútornej, ale aj zahraničnej politiky RF, bola schválená nová vojenská doktrína. Posledná naznačila kvalitatívne nové smerovanie ruského prístupu k vlastnej, ako aj európskej bezpečnosti.

Po ruskej jeseni 1993 diskusia o rozširovaní NATO nadobudla nový rozmer, pretože medzinárodné spoločenstvo už malo dočinenia s „novým“ Ruskom. V januári 1994 na summite NATO bol schválený program Partnerstvo za mier, ktorý vytvoril rámec pre reálny vojensko-politický dialóg medzi Alianciou a uchádzačmi o členstvo. Prezident USA Bill Clinton na summite vyhlásil, že otázka o rozšírení NATO už nestojí viac v podobe „či“, ale „kedy“. Hodnotiac spätne obdobie americkej politiky vo vzťahu k Rusku v rokoch 1992-1993, hovorca State Departementu Nicholas Burns poznamenal, že „najväčším omylom Bushovej a Clintonovej administrácie voči novým nezávislým štátom bývalého Sovietskeho zväzu bolo príliš dlhé zotrvávanie na rusocentristických pozíciách namiesto rozvoja dôležitých vzťahov s Ukrajinou a inými republikami“.

Roky 1994-1995 neboli úspešné pre implementáciu Kozyrevovej doktríny vo vzťahu ku krajinám SVE napriek tomu, že Slovensko vypadlo z prvej vlny integrácie do západných štruktúr. Rusko nedokázalo zastaviť proces rozširovania NATO a presadiť vlastnú víziu európskej bezpečnosti i paralelné priblíženie sa k západným štruktúram spolu s krajinami SVE.

Primakovova doktrína

V dvoch oblastiach – postsovietsky priestor a stredná Európa – bola Primakovova politika plne porovnateľná s tým, čo sformulovalo a o čo sa snažilo ruské ministerstvo zahraničných vecí za jeho predchodcu. Existujú však prinajmenšom dva zásadné rozdiely (jeden v domácom postavení a druhý v globálnej stratégii) medzi prvými dvoma ministrami zahraničných vecí Ruskej federácie v postsovietskych podmienkach: 1. Primakov bol schopný pre svoj rezort získať znovu to, čo Kozyrev stratil po jeseni 1993 – obnovil pozície ministerstva zahraničných vecí pri tvorbe ruskej zahraničnej politiky; 2. Kozyrev i Primakov zdieľali spoločný cieľ v zahraničnej politike: obnoviť posta-

venie Ruska vo svetovej politike, ktoré by bolo porovnateľné s predošlým postavením Sovietskeho zväzu. Avšak zásadný rozdiel medzi nimi spočíval v chápaní prostriedkov dosiahnutia tohto cieľa. Zatiaľ čo Kozyrev videl tento prostriedok v ustanovení strategického partnerstva so Spojenými štátmi, Primakov ho uzrel v pravom opaku: „Rusko sa musí stať aktívnym aktérom medzinárodného diania na celom svete – strednom Východe, Ázii a všade inde – práve tak, ako to bolo na konci sovietskej éry. Ruská zahraničná politika musí obhájiť ruské národné záujmy a čeliť vývoju medzinárodných vzťahov smerom k sformovaniu unipolárneho sveta pod komandom USA.”

Primakovova politika vychádza z tézy, že Rusko síce nemôže dosiahnuť aktuálne vedúce postavenie Spojených štátov vo svetovej politike, môže však významným spôsobom prispieť k tvorbe tzv. multipolárneho sveta, ktorý obnoví postavenie Ruska ako jedného z centier svetovej politiky. Medzi „póly” svetovej politiky, ktoré by sa mali podieľať na rozdelení svetovej moci, ruský minister zahraničných vecí ráta Európsku úniu, Čínu, Japonsko, ASEAN (juhovýchodná Ázia), Latinskú Ameriku a, prirodzene, Spojené štáty a Rusko (vrátane SNŠ). Primakovova verzia multipolárneho sveta, pre ktorú si získal takmer absolútnu politickú podporu doma – na rozdiel od svojho predchodcu, ktorý nebol schopný získať takúto podporu pre strategický rozvoj vzťahov s USA – poslúžila ako zdôvodnenie pre politiku zblíženia Ruska s Čínou, Iránom a Irakom v priebehu roku 1996. Primakovova politika podľa Ariela Cohena predstavuje výzvu pre Spojené štáty minimálne v dvoch strategicky významných oblastiach – Perzskom zálive a Taiwanskej úžine. Okrem toho, „Primakov sa snaží dosiahnuť exkluzívne postavenie Ruska na Kaukaze a v strednej Ázii, podporuje nevyhnutnosť integrácie krajín SNŠ s Ruskom, je stúpencom únie s Bieloruskom a presadzuje použitie sily v regióne bývalého ZSSR”. Primakovovu doktrínu, podľa Cohena, by bolo možné definovať ako „politiku snažiacu sa o zníženie sily a vplyvu Spojených štátov a zároveň zvýšenie sily a vplyvu Ruska na strednom Východe a v Eurázii”.

Podľa Primakova existovali dve hlavné otázky napätia vo vzťahoch so Západom: rozširovanie NATO a prístup Západu k integračným procesom v rámci SNŠ. Primakovova „stredoeurópska” politika bola tak v rokoch 1996-1997 sústredená predovšetkým na otázku rozširovania NATO.

Kompromis medzi Ruskom a NATO a jeho dôsledky pre strednú Európu

V prvej polovici roku 1997 sa uskutočnili rokovania medzi NATO a Ruskom o rozšírení Aliancie, ktoré vyústili do podpísania Zakladajúceho aktu 27. mája 1997 v Paríži. Ich výsledok je možné zhrnúť nasledovne:

Rusku sa nepodarilo presadiť podpísanie klasickej medzinárodnej zmluvy, ktorá by obsahovala paragrafované formulácie článkov, podmienok, záväzkov a práv, presné vymedzenie doby platnosti a pod. Na druhej strane ani NATO nedosiahlo to, čo pôvodne chcelo – prijatie iba spoločného prehlásenia alebo dokumentu v podobe Charty. Kompromis bol nájdený prijatím Zakladajúceho aktu, ktorý bol inšpirovaný formou Helsinského aktu z roku 1975. Závaznosť ustanovení Zakladajúceho aktu bola potvrdená podpismi najvyšších predstaviteľov 16 členských krajín NATO a ruského prezidenta Borisa Jelcina 27. mája 1997 v Paríži, podobne ako sa to stalo i v Helsinkách v roku 1975.

Rusko nezískalo právo veta na rozhodnutia NATO týkajúce sa otázok európskej bezpečnosti. V texte je doslovne uvedené: „Ustanovenia tohto aktu nenadeľujú NATO alebo Rusko, v žiadnom prípade, právom veta na činnosť jednej alebo druhej strany, ani z nich nevyplýva žiadne obmedzenie práva NATO alebo Ruska na nezávislé rozhodovanie a aktivity.“ Na strane druhej celá II. časť textu aktu stanovuje podrobný mechanizmus konzultácií, zriadenie a fungovanie Stálej spoločnej Rady NATO-Rusko, ktorý garantuje Rusku – minimálne – konzultatívnu účasť na rozhodovaní o otázkach európskej bezpečnosti prijímaných NATO. Javier Solana tento kompromis vystihol presne, keď uviedol: „Rusko nebude môcť blokovať vlastné rozhodnutia NATO. Rusko však môže očakávať, že NATO seriózne vypočuje a zoberie do úvahy jeho legitímne záujmy.“

Rusku sa nepodarilo dosiahnuť zo strany NATO výslovne sformulovaný záväzok, že prvá vlna rozšírenia NATO bude zároveň i poslednou. Naopak, v texte aktu sa otázka ďalšieho rozširovania NATO priamo prakticky ani len nespomína. Zato Madridská deklarácia NATO, ktorej predchádzalo podpísanie aktu, deklaruje v článku 8: „Znovu potvrdzujeme, že NATO zostáva otvorené pre nových členov v súlade s článkom 10 Severoatlantickej zmluvy. Štáty, ktoré prejavili záujem o členstvo, ale dnes neboli pozvané na začatie rozhovorov o pristúpení, zostávajú v úvahe pre členstvo v budúcnosti. Aliancia očakáva, že v najbližších rokoch pozve na rokovania o pristúpení ďalšie štáty, ktoré si to budú želať a budú schopné prevziať zodpovednosť a povinnosti vyplývajúce z členstva...“ Druhá polovica tej istej vety však znie: „...pričom NATO zvaží, či by pristúpenie týchto štátov poslúžilo všeobecným politickým a strategickým záujmom Aliancie a či by ich pristúpenie posilnilo všeobecnú európsku bezpečnosť a stabilitu.“ Inými slovami, Madridská deklarácia neobsahuje žiadnu pasáž, ktorá by výslovne stanovovala, že proces rozširovania NATO bude nevyhnutne a skutočne pokračovať. Ten istý článok obsahuje i nasledujúcu vetu: „...s cieľom posilnenia všeobecnej bezpeč-

nosti a stability v Európe, ďalšie kroky v uskutočňovanom procese rozširovania Aliancie musia zohľadniť bezpečnostné záujmy všetkých Spojencov.”

K úspechu ruskej diplomacie je možné zaradiť prihlásenie sa Aliancie k záväzku nerozmiestniť na území nových členov jadrovej zbrane: „Členské štáty NATO znova potvrdzujú, že nemajú žiadny zámer, žiadny plán a žiadnu príčinu, aby umiestnili na území nových členov jadrovej zbrane, ani žiadnu potrebu zmeniť akýkoľvek aspekt jadrovej politiky a nepredpokladajú akúkoľvek potrebu urobiť tak v budúcnosti.” Nie tak jednoznačný úspech, aspoň čo sa týka priamych formulácií v texte Zakladajúceho aktu, dosiahlo Rusko pri požiadavkách na stanovenie obmedzení operačných jednotiek NATO a využitia existujúcej vojenskej infraštruktúry v nových členských krajinách. Je potrebné zdôrazniť, že najväčšiu spokojnosť na ruskej strane vyvolalo prijatie spoločného záväzku pristúpiť k dôkladnej revízii Zmluvy o konvenčných silách v Európe (CFE), ktorá by zohľadnila novú bezpečnostnú situáciu v Európe vrátane existencie rozšíreného NATO. Jevgenij Primakov ešte pred začatím rozhovorov v januári 1997 podmienil touto skutočnosťou vôbec možný súhlas Ruska s podpisom dohody s NATO. Počas návštevy Madeleine Allbrightovej v Moskve na začiatku mája 1997 sa strany dohodli na tom, že „*všetky ostávajúce problémy sa zaväzujú riešiť prostredníctvom modernizácie CFE*” (kurz. – autor). V tejto súvislosti sa M. Allbrightová vyjadrila, že „USA už ustúpili Rusku vo všetkom, v čom bolo možné ustúpiť”.

Revíziou CFE Rusko sleduje dva zásadné ciele súčasne. Zníženie limitov počtov konvenčných zbraní osobitne pre každú európsku krajinu by predovšetkým znamenalo, že NATO nebude môcť umiestniť v nových členských krajinách významné vojenské sily. V dohode o limitoch konvenčných síl pre ČR, Poľsko a Maďarsko by tak bolo možné vlastne stanoviť presné limity pre dislokáciu „cudzích” (t. j. NATO) jednotiek na ich územiach. Ďalej, vzhľadom na to, že NATO na rozdiel od VZ existuje i naďalej, Moskva chce v revízii CFE zachovať i limity konvenčných síl pre „skupiny štátov”. V tomto prípade by bolo otázne akékoľvek ďalšie rozširovanie NATO o nové krajiny. Vstup každej ďalšej krajiny by totiž automaticky predpokladal ďalšiu revíziu CFE. V opačnom prípade by musel každý nový člen NATO podstatným spôsobom obmedziť stavy svojej konvenčnej výzbroje, čo by samozrejme zákonite znížilo jeho schopnosti prispieť k obrannému potenciálu Aliancie, a, prirodzene, aj záujmu Aliancie o takého člena. Zakladajúci akt naznačuje, v akom smere by mala napredovať revízia CFE: „Členské krajiny NATO a Rusko zdôrazňujú, že zmluvné štáty CFE musia udržiavať iba také vojenské kapacity, individuálne alebo v spojení s inými, ktoré sú adekvátne ich legitímnym bezpečnostným potrebám, berúc do úvahy ich medzinárodné záväzky vrátane zmluvy CFE.”

Rozhovory medzi Ruskom a NATO o jeho rozšírení na východ sa podpisom Zakladajúceho aktu neskončili a pokračujú ďalej v rokovaní o adaptácii zmluvy CFE. Podpis Zakladajúceho aktu nemožno hodnotiť ako jednoznačné víťazstvo diplomacie žiadnej zo strán. Existuje však niekoľko zásadných skutočností, ktoré hovoria skôr v prospech ruskej diplomacie – z pohľadu tých krajín SVE, ktoré sa nestanú členmi NATO v prvej vlně – napriek tomu, že nedosiahla pri podpise Zakladajúceho aktu splnenie všetkých svojich pôvodných požiadaviek. NATO sa síce podarilo získať „nepriamy“ ruský súhlas s prvou vlnou rozšírenia, vyšlo však v ústrety globálnym ruským požiadavkám, ktoré vracajú Rusko na kvalitatívne novej úrovni do bezpečnostnej agendy Európy po ukončení studenej vojny a po rozpade ZSSR. Ďalšie rozširovanie NATO, ak sa vôbec nejaké uskutoční, bude prebiehať v oveľa prepletenejšej pavučine európskych bezpečnostných záväzkov, než to bolo doteraz. Okrem toho sa Primakovovi v Zakladajúcom akte podarilo oddeliť vzťahy Rusko-NATO v Európe od vzťahov Rusko-USA vo svete. Zakladajúci akt nenúti ruskú zahraničnú politiku zmeniť obsah presadzovanej zahraničnej doktríny, tak ako ju celkom úspešne demonštrovalo v rokoch 1996-1997. Svedčí o tom i text Koncepcie národnej bezpečnosti Ruskej federácie schválenej pol roka po podpise Zakladajúceho aktu: „Formovane mnohopolárneho sveta bude dlhotrvajúcim procesom. Na súčasnej etape sa ešte stále silne prejavujú recidívy pokusov o vytvorenie štruktúry medzinárodných vzťahov založenej na jednostranných, vrátane vojensko-silových, riešení kľúčových problémov svetovej politiky... Perspektíva rozšírenia NATO na východ je pre Rusko neprijateľná, pretože predstavuje hrozbu pre jeho národnú bezpečnosť.“

V dôsledku predpokladaného rozšírenia NATO nebude európska bezpečnostná architektúra založená na hierarchizovanom systéme na báze OBSE, ale bude mať pluralistický charakter – vedľa seba existujúcich inštitúcií. Madridský summit NATO v júli 1997 i Luxemburský summit EÚ v decembri 1997 prijali rozhodnutie o rozšírení smerom na východ. Končí sa tak významná etapa formovania novej architektúry Európy po ukončení studenej vojny. Rovnako sa skončila i významná etapa ruskej zahraničnej politiky vo vzťahu ku krajinám SVE, ktorá sa odvíjala predovšetkým na pozadí vzťahov so Západom. V novej situácii bude možné očakávať nárast realistických prvkov a oveľa väčšiu variabilitu individuálneho i regionálneho prístupu v zahraničnej politike Ruska smerom k postsovietskemu priestoru, Európe i regiónu SVE.