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 ===== Bibliography ===== ===== Bibliography =====
 +A’Beckett,L.(2013).Strategies to Discredit Opponents: Russian Presentations of Events in Countries of the Former Soviet Union. Psychology of Language and Communication,17(2) 133-156. https://doi.org/10.2478/plc-2013-0009
  
 Alieva, I., Moffitt, J. D., & Carley, K. M. (2022). How disinformation operations against Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny influence the international audience on Twitter. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 12(1), 1-13. Alieva, I., Moffitt, J. D., & Carley, K. M. (2022). How disinformation operations against Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny influence the international audience on Twitter. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 12(1), 1-13.
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 Doroshenko, L., & Lukito, J. (2021). Trollfare: Russia’s Disinformation Campaign During Military Conflict in Ukraine. International Journal of Communication, 15, 28. Doroshenko, L., & Lukito, J. (2021). Trollfare: Russia’s Disinformation Campaign During Military Conflict in Ukraine. International Journal of Communication, 15, 28.
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 +European External Action Service’s (2023). EEEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats.{{ :eeas-threatreport-february2023-02.pdf |}}
  
 Fallis, D. (2009). A conceptual analysis of disinformation. Fallis, D. (2009). A conceptual analysis of disinformation.
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 Farkas, J., & Bastos, M. (2018, July). IRA propaganda on Twitter: Stoking antagonism and tweeting local news. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on social media and society (pp. 281-285). Farkas, J., & Bastos, M. (2018, July). IRA propaganda on Twitter: Stoking antagonism and tweeting local news. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on social media and society (pp. 281-285).
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 +Flores-Saviaga, C., Keegan, B., & Savage, S. (2018, June). Mobilizing the trump train: Understanding collective action in a political trolling community. In Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (Vol. 12, No. 1).
  
 François, C., Nimmo, B., & Eib, C. S. (2019). The IRA copypasta campaign. Graphika, okt. François, C., Nimmo, B., & Eib, C. S. (2019). The IRA copypasta campaign. Graphika, okt.
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 Golovchenko, Y., Buntain, C., Eady, G., Brown, M. A., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). Cross-platform state propaganda: Russian trolls on Twitter and YouTube during the 2016 US presidential election. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(3), 357-389. Golovchenko, Y., Buntain, C., Eady, G., Brown, M. A., & Tucker, J. A. (2020). Cross-platform state propaganda: Russian trolls on Twitter and YouTube during the 2016 US presidential election. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(3), 357-389.
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 +Guimaraes, A., Balalau, O., Terolli, E., & Weikum, G. (2019, July). Analyzing the traits and anomalies of political discussions on reddit. In Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (Vol. 13, pp. 205-213).
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 +Hale, H. E., Shevel, O., & Onuch, O. (2018). Believing facts in the fog of war: identity, media and hot cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa tragedy. Geopolitics, 23(4), 851-881.{{ :believing_facts_in_the_fog_of_war_identi.pdf |}}
  
 Holland, M. (2006). The propagation and power of communist security services dezinformatsiya. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(1), 1-31. Holland, M. (2006). The propagation and power of communist security services dezinformatsiya. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(1), 1-31.
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 Kilkenny, E. (2021). Russian Disinformation–The Technological Force Multiplier. Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture, 2. Kilkenny, E. (2021). Russian Disinformation–The Technological Force Multiplier. Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture, 2.
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 King, F. (2018). Reflexive control and disinformation in putin’s wars. King, F. (2018). Reflexive control and disinformation in putin’s wars.
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 +Kling, J., Toepfl, F., Thurman, N., & Fletcher, R. (2022). Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-110 
  
 Kollanyi, B., Howard, P. N., & Woolley, S. C. (2016). Bots and automation over Twitter during the first US presidential debate. Comprop data memo, 1, 1-4. Kollanyi, B., Howard, P. N., & Woolley, S. C. (2016). Bots and automation over Twitter during the first US presidential debate. Comprop data memo, 1, 1-4.
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 Lanoszka, A. (2019). Disinformation in international politics. European journal of international security, 4(2), 227-248. Lanoszka, A. (2019). Disinformation in international politics. European journal of international security, 4(2), 227-248.
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 +Laruelle, M., & Limonier, K. (2021). Beyond “hybrid warfare”: a digital exploration of Russia’s entrepreneurs of influence. Post-Soviet Affairs, 37(4), 318-335.{{ ::laurellelimonie2021influencer.pdf |}}
 +
  
 Lewis, R., & Marwick, A. (2017). Taking the red pill: Ideological motivations for spreading online disinformation. Understanding and addressing the disinformation ecosystem, 18-22. Lewis, R., & Marwick, A. (2017). Taking the red pill: Ideological motivations for spreading online disinformation. Understanding and addressing the disinformation ecosystem, 18-22.
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 Walker, S., Mercea, D., & Bastos, M. (2019). The disinformation landscape and the lockdown of social platforms. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1531-1543. Walker, S., Mercea, D., & Bastos, M. (2019). The disinformation landscape and the lockdown of social platforms. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1531-1543.
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 +Watling, J., Danylyuk, O. V., & Reynolds, N. (2023). Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations During the Russo-Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023.
  
 Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation, performed: Self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646-1664 Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation, performed: Self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646-1664
disinformation.txt · Last modified: 2023/08/06 13:58 by jgmac1106