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disinformation [2023/05/24 01:10] – jgmac1106disinformation [2023/06/08 16:59] – adding kling et al jgmac1106
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 ===== Bibliography ===== ===== Bibliography =====
 +A’Beckett,L.(2013).Strategies to Discredit Opponents: Russian Presentations of Events in Countries of the Former Soviet Union. Psychology of Language and Communication,17(2) 133-156. https://doi.org/10.2478/plc-2013-0009
  
 Alieva, I., Moffitt, J. D., & Carley, K. M. (2022). How disinformation operations against Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny influence the international audience on Twitter. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 12(1), 1-13. Alieva, I., Moffitt, J. D., & Carley, K. M. (2022). How disinformation operations against Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny influence the international audience on Twitter. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 12(1), 1-13.
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 Kilkenny, E. (2021). Russian Disinformation–The Technological Force Multiplier. Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture, 2. Kilkenny, E. (2021). Russian Disinformation–The Technological Force Multiplier. Global Insight: A Journal of Critical Human Science and Culture, 2.
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 King, F. (2018). Reflexive control and disinformation in putin’s wars. King, F. (2018). Reflexive control and disinformation in putin’s wars.
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 +Kling, J., Toepfl, F., Thurman, N., & Fletcher, R. (2022). Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries. Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-110 
  
 Kollanyi, B., Howard, P. N., & Woolley, S. C. (2016). Bots and automation over Twitter during the first US presidential debate. Comprop data memo, 1, 1-4. Kollanyi, B., Howard, P. N., & Woolley, S. C. (2016). Bots and automation over Twitter during the first US presidential debate. Comprop data memo, 1, 1-4.
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 Laruelle, M., & Limonier, K. (2021). Beyond “hybrid warfare”: a digital exploration of Russia’s entrepreneurs of influence. Post-Soviet Affairs, 37(4), 318-335.{{ ::laurellelimonie2021influencer.pdf |}} Laruelle, M., & Limonier, K. (2021). Beyond “hybrid warfare”: a digital exploration of Russia’s entrepreneurs of influence. Post-Soviet Affairs, 37(4), 318-335.{{ ::laurellelimonie2021influencer.pdf |}}
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 Lewis, R., & Marwick, A. (2017). Taking the red pill: Ideological motivations for spreading online disinformation. Understanding and addressing the disinformation ecosystem, 18-22. Lewis, R., & Marwick, A. (2017). Taking the red pill: Ideological motivations for spreading online disinformation. Understanding and addressing the disinformation ecosystem, 18-22.
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 Walker, S., Mercea, D., & Bastos, M. (2019). The disinformation landscape and the lockdown of social platforms. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1531-1543. Walker, S., Mercea, D., & Bastos, M. (2019). The disinformation landscape and the lockdown of social platforms. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1531-1543.
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 +Watling, J., Danylyuk, O. V., & Reynolds, N. (2023). Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Unconventional Operations During the Russo-Ukrainian War, February 2022–February 2023.
  
 Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation, performed: Self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646-1664 Xia, Y., Lukito, J., Zhang, Y., Wells, C., Kim, S. J., & Tong, C. (2019). Disinformation, performed: Self-presentation of a Russian IRA account on Twitter. Information, Communication & Society, 22(11), 1646-1664
disinformation.txt · Last modified: 2023/08/06 13:58 by jgmac1106