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reflexive_control [2023/03/07 17:09] – jgmac1106reflexive_control [2023/08/03 00:32] – jgmac1106
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 {{ :civilianvictimhood.pdf |Downes, A. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measures: The causes of civilian victimization in war. International Security, 30(4), 152-195.}} {{ :civilianvictimhood.pdf |Downes, A. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measures: The causes of civilian victimization in war. International Security, 30(4), 152-195.}}
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 +Giles, K. (2011, June). "{{ ::russian_cyber_command.pdf |Information Troops”-A Russian Cyber Command}}". In 2011 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict (pp. 1-16). IEEE.
  
 Hansen, W. G. (2013). {{ :ada584080.pdf |Influence: theory and practice}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEFENSE ANALYSIS DEPT. Hansen, W. G. (2013). {{ :ada584080.pdf |Influence: theory and practice}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEFENSE ANALYSIS DEPT.
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 Joseph, M. J. S. {{ ::joesphinformationwarfare19.pdf |FUTURE WAR PAPER}}. School of Advanced Warfighting Joseph, M. J. S. {{ ::joesphinformationwarfare19.pdf |FUTURE WAR PAPER}}. School of Advanced Warfighting
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 +Kasapoglu, C. (2015). {{ ::russia_s_renewed_military_thinking.pdf |Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control}}. NATO Defense College, Research Division.
  
 Medvedev, S. A. (2015). {{ :medvedev2014.pdf |Offense-defense theory analysis of Russian cyber capability}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA. Medvedev, S. A. (2015). {{ :medvedev2014.pdf |Offense-defense theory analysis of Russian cyber capability}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA.
  
 Potîrniche, M. T. (2019). {{ :portirnichereflexivecontrol.pdf |Theory of reflexive control–element of the non-linear Russian war}}. Strategic Impact, (72+ 73), 48-58. Potîrniche, M. T. (2019). {{ :portirnichereflexivecontrol.pdf |Theory of reflexive control–element of the non-linear Russian war}}. Strategic Impact, (72+ 73), 48-58.
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 +Shandra, A., & Seely, R. (2019). The Surkov Leaks: The Inner Workings of Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine. RUSI Occasional Paper. Retrieved from https://rusi. org/publication/occasional-papers/surkov-leaks-inner-workings-russias-hybrid-war-ukraine.[
  
 Szpyra, R. (2020). {{ ::russian_information_offensive_in_th.pdf |Russian information offensive in the international relations}}. Security and Defence Quarterly, 30(3), 31-48. Szpyra, R. (2020). {{ ::russian_information_offensive_in_th.pdf |Russian information offensive in the international relations}}. Security and Defence Quarterly, 30(3), 31-48.
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 Thomas, T. (2004).{{ :thomas_2004.pdf | Russia's reflexive control theory and the military}}. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(2), 237-256. Thomas, T. (2004).{{ :thomas_2004.pdf | Russia's reflexive control theory and the military}}. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(2), 237-256.
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 +Whitley, G. L. (2000). {{ ::whitleypsyop2000.pdf |PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century}}. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.
  
reflexive_control.txt · Last modified: 2023/08/03 00:32 by jgmac1106