User Tools

Site Tools


reflexive_control

Differences

This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.

Link to this comparison view

Both sides previous revisionPrevious revision
Next revision
Previous revision
reflexive_control [2023/03/07 16:56] jgmac1106reflexive_control [2023/08/03 00:32] (current) jgmac1106
Line 11: Line 11:
  
 {{ :civilianvictimhood.pdf |Downes, A. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measures: The causes of civilian victimization in war. International Security, 30(4), 152-195.}} {{ :civilianvictimhood.pdf |Downes, A. B. (2006). Desperate times, desperate measures: The causes of civilian victimization in war. International Security, 30(4), 152-195.}}
 +
 +Giles, K. (2011, June). "{{ ::russian_cyber_command.pdf |Information Troops”-A Russian Cyber Command}}". In 2011 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict (pp. 1-16). IEEE.
 +
 +Hansen, W. G. (2013). {{ :ada584080.pdf |Influence: theory and practice}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEFENSE ANALYSIS DEPT.
  
 Hosaka, S. (2019). Putin the ‘Peacemaker’?—Russian Reflexive Control During the 2014 August Invasion of Ukraine. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 32(3), 324-346. Hosaka, S. (2019). Putin the ‘Peacemaker’?—Russian Reflexive Control During the 2014 August Invasion of Ukraine. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 32(3), 324-346.
Line 19: Line 23:
  
 Joseph, M. J. S. {{ ::joesphinformationwarfare19.pdf |FUTURE WAR PAPER}}. School of Advanced Warfighting Joseph, M. J. S. {{ ::joesphinformationwarfare19.pdf |FUTURE WAR PAPER}}. School of Advanced Warfighting
 +
 +Kasapoglu, C. (2015). {{ ::russia_s_renewed_military_thinking.pdf |Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control}}. NATO Defense College, Research Division.
 +
 +Medvedev, S. A. (2015). {{ :medvedev2014.pdf |Offense-defense theory analysis of Russian cyber capability}}. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA.
  
 Potîrniche, M. T. (2019). {{ :portirnichereflexivecontrol.pdf |Theory of reflexive control–element of the non-linear Russian war}}. Strategic Impact, (72+ 73), 48-58. Potîrniche, M. T. (2019). {{ :portirnichereflexivecontrol.pdf |Theory of reflexive control–element of the non-linear Russian war}}. Strategic Impact, (72+ 73), 48-58.
 +
 +Shandra, A., & Seely, R. (2019). The Surkov Leaks: The Inner Workings of Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine. RUSI Occasional Paper. Retrieved from {{ :seelyandshandrasurkovleaksfinalii.pdf |}}
 +
 +Szpyra, R. (2020). {{ ::russian_information_offensive_in_th.pdf |Russian information offensive in the international relations}}. Security and Defence Quarterly, 30(3), 31-48.
 +
 +Thomas, T. L. (1996). {{ ::thomas1996.pdf |Russian Views on Information-Based Wafare}}. AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL AIRPOWER JOURNAL.
 +
 +Thomas, T. L. (1999). {{ ::1999-09-01_human_network_attacks_thomas_.pdf |Human network attacks}}. Military Review, 79(5), 23-34
  
 Thomas, T. (2004).{{ :thomas_2004.pdf | Russia's reflexive control theory and the military}}. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(2), 237-256. Thomas, T. (2004).{{ :thomas_2004.pdf | Russia's reflexive control theory and the military}}. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(2), 237-256.
 +
 +Whitley, G. L. (2000). {{ ::whitleypsyop2000.pdf |PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century}}. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA.
  
reflexive_control.1678208202.txt.gz · Last modified: 2023/03/07 16:56 by jgmac1106