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War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

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How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's "News of the Week" show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the "fascist" and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a "television party" and an "Internet party" in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.

Keywords: state media; the Internet; frames; Russia; Ukraine

Introduction

To encourage popular support for Russia's annexation of Crimea and its backing of separatists in eastern Ukraine, Russian state television portrayed the post-Viktor Yanukovych government in Kyiv as a "fascist junta" working in the interests of the USA while praising President Vladimir Putin's resort to military force to defend Russian interests. As a result of this effort, Putin's popularity rating rose above 85%[1] and the Russian population seemed to accept the Kremlin's framing of events in Ukraine following the Euromaidan protests and departure of Yanukovych in February 2014. On the surface, the Kremlin's efforts appear to have been highly successful in shaping domestic opinion as Russia's invasion of Ukraine encouraged a "rally around the flag" effect (Baum and Groeling 2010), boosting Putin's legitimacy as Russia's leader, and creating the mindset that the country was under seige. But, how effective has Kremlin messaging been in affecting the increasingly important Internet audience inside Russia? Does it make sense to speak of a "television party" and an "Internet party" as separate and competing entities in Russia? What ultimately is the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet?

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Logically, the direction of influence can go from the Internet to television, as well as from television to the Internet. A third possibility is that the Internet and television influence each other in a continuous loop. Several studies of Russia's media have demonstrated the impact of the Internet on television. For example, topics that go viral on the Internet force the authorities to respond to ensure that the online discussions do not ultimately turn into street protests against the leadership (Petrov, Lipman, and Hale 2014). The 2011–2012 protests were a good example of how the Internet, which helped organize the protests, was responsible for forcing state television to report on the popular discontent (Oates 2013). Such Internet influence on television is apparent in other countries as well, including in the USA (Davis 2009). In contrast to these studies, our analysis examines the influence of television on the Internet and ultimately concludes that there is a continuous loop in which each influences the other.

This finding allows us to address the debate over whether there are separate Internet and television parties in Russia. Before the annexation of Crimea, analysts, such as *Novaia gazeta* editor Dmitri Muratov, building on the broader work of Castells (2000), had often divided Russian society into the television party, which supported the Kremlin, and the Internet party, which supported the opposition (The Liberal Mission Foundation and the Moscow Office of the Kennan Institute 2014). Internet users are generally younger, richer, better educated, more urban, and more active than those who watch television in Russia (Volkov and Goncharov 2014). Even as the authorities control most of the traditional media, the Internet provides a platform for the opposition beyond official control (Gorham 2014).

However, with the apparent success of Kremlin propaganda, prominent Russian newspapers, like *Vedomosti*, began publishing the results of studies that showed that "the internet party no longer exists." According to such works, "The internet today is a mirror of Russian society, and like all of our society, it is under the strong and organized influence of state propaganda" (Krasheninnikov 2014). Similarly, Levada Center public opinion polling research demonstrates that the level of support for the authorities among Internet users is not significantly different from the level of support among other members of Russian society (Volkov and Goncharov 2014). Even before the Ukraine crisis, prominent scholars, such as Emil Pain, had questioned whether the party of the Internet actually existed.

> Until recently, the expert community of political scientists cherished a bright image of the "party of the internet" and counted on it as a source of salvation. And what did we discover? That the physiognomy of the being that stares out at us from the internet is just as grubby as that of the "party of television." (The Liberal Mission Foundation and the Moscow Office of the Kennan Institute 2014, 96–97)

Our analysis leads us to conclude that it does not make sense to distinguish between separate Internet and television parties in Russia.

This article examines and evaluates some of the key mechanisms and consequences of the Kremlin's framing of the Ukraine conflict. The data it employs are both qualitative and quantitative and come from a variety of sources. First, as a proxy for the overall Kremlin framing effort, we performed a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's weekly news roundup *Vesti nedeli* (News of the Week) spanning the course of the five months following Yanukovych's departure from Kyiv. Specifically, we viewed the 18 episodes broadcast between 23 February 2014 and 13 July 2014. We chose to analyze Kiselev in detail because of his appointment as the Kremlin's chief opinion maker, as the general director of the Rossiia Segodnia news agency. Kiselev also attracted our attention due the extreme and radical character of his shows. We chose Kiselev as a sort of magnifying glass, the extreme case that we will use to clarify the general message disseminated on

Russian television. Moreover, evidence from the Pussy Riot case suggests that *Vesti nedeli* can have a powerful impact on the way that other Russian media outlets cover important stories (Yablokov 2014, 630), so we have reason to believe that what Kiselev said shaped the way that many other Russian journalists covered the events in Ukraine.

Therefore, rather than searching for propaganda on *Vesti nedeli*, our goal was to detect and analyze the major frames used by Kiselev and to find framing devices: emotionally charged words and catch phrases that are representative of each frame employed. Therefore, in the qualitative part of the paper, we layout and analyze the two major frames implemented on *Vesti nedeli* to portray the events in Ukraine: World War II/fascism and anti-Americanism. Kiselev's style of news-making is conducive to frame-analysis via words as framing devices, for wordplay is a central feature of Kiselev's show. Kiselev is notorious for his word choice, and during the show, he often makes up new phrases or highlights specific buzzwords on a large screen visible behind him.

Next, in the quantitative section of our article, we present data on the reaction of the Russian Internet audience to the words (frames) that Kiselev uses. These data are drawn from search patterns in Google and Yandex, Russia's most popular search engine. With the help of these data, we attempt to answer the question: Have Russians adopted the rhetoric propagated on Russian media as exemplified by Kiselev to understand the conflict in Ukraine? Do they use the World War II and anti-American frames to understand what goes on in neighboring Ukraine?

The conclusion lays out our findings and argument for rejecting the notion that there are separate Internet and television parties in Russia. Our research demonstrates that when it comes to the conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin framing of the issue was indeed effective and influenced Russia's Internet audience. However, our work also shows that the state media framing's impact is not as impressive when compared to the past Internet success of opposition leader Alexey Navalny – who became famous by exposing instances of corruption in Russia.

Why Dmitrii Kiselev?

Dmitrii Kiselev is the man at the helm of Russia's state-owned media. As the general director of the *Rossiia Segodnia*[2] news agency and host of the "infotainment" news show *Vesti nedeli* (News of the Week), broadcast in prime time on Sunday evening on Russia's second most important television network, he is in a prominent position to set the tone for Russia's informational warfare. Kiselev is as powerful as he is notorious. In a March 2014 poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Kiselev was named the second "most respected and authoritative" journalist in Russia.[3] His *Vesti nedeli* is the second most popular Sunday news program, following the *Vremia* broadcast on First Channel, according to the TNS ratings.[4] The show ranked seven in the top 100 broadcasts on average during February to July 2014, ranging from three to 14. The broadcast achieved an average rating of 5.7% and average audience share of 17.2%. Kiselev's prominent role in backing Russian aggression in Ukraine, however, earned him enough infamy in the West to be the only journalist sanctioned by the European Union following Russia's annexation of Crimea.[5]

Power and fame such as Kiselev's are not earned without the proper connections. His close relationship with President Vladimir Putin is no secret. When Putin awarded Kiselev the Order of "Service to the Fatherland" in February 2014, he commented that state propaganda should only be dealt with by "patriotically inclined people."[6] In June 2014, Kiselev was appointed to an advisory position on the newly formed Presidential Council on Russian Language.[7] Advisors on the Council are tasked with defining and supporting the

development of the Russian language in the Russian Federation and abroad – an assignment appropriate for someone with Kiselev's inventive verbal skills.

Kiselev assumed the leadership of *Rossiia Segodnia* thanks to a presidential decree signed on 9 December 2013 that liquidated the state-owned RIA Novosti news agency and radio station Voice of Russia (*Golos Rossii*).[8] Under previous editor Svetlana Mironiuk, RIA Novosti had earned a reputation for providing objective information. The two former media hubs were fused to create the present-day *Rossiia Segodnia*.

In addition to his control of *Rossiia Segodnia*, Kiselev serves as the deputy general director of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK), Russia's largest media corporation. While *Rossiia Segodnia* is independent of VGTRK, *Vesti nedeli* airs on the *Rossiia 1* national television network owned by VGTRK, which claims to be "present in all niches" of Russian television today. Approximately 70% of respondents named a VGTRK-operated channel as their primary source of Russian news from 2011 to 2013, according to a study conducted by the Levada Center, an independent public opinion research organization (Levada Analytical Center 2013, 135). TNS data for the week 7–13 July 2014 show that Rossiia 1 was the second most popular network in Russia, following First Channel.

Because Kiselev's control over state-owned media extends vertically and horizontally, *Vesti nedeli* was an ideal target for analysis thanks to the connections surrounding its charismatic host. However, the show's content is where its true powers lie. Even within Russia, *Vesti nedeli* has attracted attention because Kiselev is "a masterly, and unapologetic, purveyor of the Kremlin line" and thanks to the relentlessly theatrical way in which he delivers his analysis (Remnick 2014).

Kiselev has promoted conservative values since his version of *Vesti nedeli* went on the air in 2012, often framing segments of his show around such conservative themes as homophobia, the Russian Orthodox Church, and chauvinistic gender roles. Kiselev himself describes his show as an onstage performance and self-promotion,[9] though he rejects criticism that it promotes homophobic or state propagandist goals.[10] However, he remains dogged by a televised debate in which he argued that the hearts of gay people who die in automobile accidents should be incinerated rather than used for organ donations.[11] In an *Izvestiia* interview, Kiselev explained that those comments were a "deliberate provocation" to ignite a "polemical" program where "conflicting opinions were intentionally laid out as part of the show" (Kashevarova 2014).

A showman's techniques

The key problem for state television is to present the state's message in a way that attracts viewer attention. With a clear understanding that tone and sentiment affect the way audiences understand content (Westen 2007), Kiselev captures and holds the audience's attention by developing the emotion generated from the events at the center of his analysis. For example, the host frequently ridicules American figures, usually President Barack Obama or State Department spokeswoman Jennifer Psaki, with personal commentary and sneering descriptions of their actions. Conversely, he attempts to elicit more respectful emotions from the audience to support Putin when contrasting him against Western politicians or during segments that paint Russians as the victims of Western aggression.

Part of Kiselev's success in imparting his message is the teacher-like role he assumes as he introduces news segments. He casts himself as an authoritative figure who lays out the truth for his audience. The screen behind Kiselev in each episode works as a teacher's blackboard. As he strolls back and forth through the studio, words are frequently projected

on the screen behind him during his narration. The word or phrase shown at a given moment is commonly a direct repetition of what Kiselev is saying, mimicking a tactic used in teaching new vocabulary to students by first speaking the word or phrase aloud, and then writing it on the board for students to visualize. Other times, the words projected on the screen are never repeated verbatim by Kiselev, but constitute a short phrase that serves as a title or label for the segment presently being covered. For example, a picture of snipers in Slovyansk projected on the screen in back was overlaid with the word *blokada*, or siege.[12] Kiselev himself never says the word *blokada* in his narration but this word, which is so emotionally reminiscent of the World War II siege of Leningrad, is left hovering on the screen as he details the fighting between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian separatists in Donbas. This type of sensory manipulation disseminates Kiselev's intended message by doing much of the work for him. The audience comes to associate a given word or phrase with a context in which it was previously unused through visual manipulation.

As a complement to his lecturing techniques, Kiselev's manner of conduct completes his role as a teacher on *Vesti nedeli*. Kiselev affirms his authority through his confident posture, habit of strolling across the room, and gesticulations – which have earned renown in their own right. In a meeting with *The New Yorker* editor David Remnick, Kiselev responded to a question about these hand tricks by noting that "gestures go right to the subconscious without any resistance" (Remnick 2014).

Importing foreign methods

Russia's state media borrows heavily from a variety of foreign examples. It is playing a role similar to what the media did in the former Yugoslavia, where they helped "in perpetrating lies about genocidal threats, awakening forgotten fears and hatreds, and preparing once peaceful neighbors to suspect, hate, confront, and finally, kill each other in the last decade of the twentieth century" (Kurspahic 2003, xii).

Kiselev's techniques on *Vesti nedeli* shares similar characteristics with the content on Fox News, the American television network that evolved from being a conservative-leaning outlet to a media platform that now has a symbiotic relationship with the Republican Party (Brock and Rabin-Havt 2012). Both *Vesti nedeli* and programs on Fox News are known for promoting viewpoints more radical than those of their audiences. Both outlets frequently take an obscure person or event ignored by other media and blow it up into a sensational story for their benefit. The most prominent example of this on *Vesti nedeli* is undoubtedly the incessant mockery of State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki. On Fox News, one example of such sensationalization is the "War on Christmas" coverage, where the network finds examples of Christmas imagery being removed from the public square prior to the holiday season and frames the stories as religious attacks (Brock and Rabin-Havt 2012). Similarly, former Fox News anchor Glenn Beck used his chalkboard as the primary medium for mapping out his arguments, while the screen behind Dmitrii Kiselev serves as a complement to his upfront lecturing. This brief analysis of Kiselev's delivery methods lays the foundation for a more in-depth study of his show's contents that make up the next section.

Frames in Kiselev's *Vesti nedeli*

Understanding frames

Kiselev's *Vesti nedeli*, as a representative of Russian news in general, is a great case study of agenda-setting theory, the central idea of which is that the more frequently and prominently a

certain issue is covered in the news, the more important it appears to the audience as a result (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1988). Agenda-setting theory has as one of its theoretical premises the concept of accessibility, which implies that the audience's judgments are directly influenced by the information that is most easily retrievable from memory (Scheufele 2000). Memory, in turn, is influenced by the frequency of the encounter with information. Whether information appears truthful or not, its frequent repitition ensures that it is rememberd and, as a result, employed in the process of opinion formation.

Watching *Vesti nedeli* makes it clear what sort of "news" Kiselev wants to be most memorable to his audience. For the months following the Euromaidan, the vast majority of material on *Vesti nedeli* was devoted to the events in Ukraine, whether directly or implicitly. The episode of the show that came out five days after a Moscow Metro accident killed 24 people in summer 2014, the deadliest incident in the history of the system, failed to feature a single report on the tragedy.[13] The intentions of the Russian media, as represented by the Kiselev's show, were thus clear: to make the war in Ukraine the central agenda of news and the issue of primary importance to Russians and thus to divert their attention from negative domestic issues. As can be seen in a June 2014 Levada Center poll,[14] the media had succeeded in that, since the top six "most *memorable* events" [emphasis added] for Russians were connected to the crisis in Ukraine.

While the application of agenda-setting theory yields valuable results in the case of the Russian media, in our research we were mostly interested in the way Russian television employs various frames to represent the Ukrainian crisis. While we believe that the frames used by Kiselev aid in increasing the salience of the war in Ukraine, we understand framing as separate from agenda setting. Unlike some researchers who see framing as second-level agenda setting (McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver 1997) – that is, as concerned with the salience of the aspects of the issue rather than the issue itself – we distinguish the two as concerned with essentially two different questions. Rather than being interested in *what* the authorities want Russians to think about – this we have answered above with the help of agenda-setting theory – we want to see *how* they are encouraged to perceive certain issues, and in particular the war in neighboring Ukraine.

Unlike agenda-setting theory, which is based on the "assumption of attitude accessibility and, in particular, a memory-based model of information processing," framing theory is based on the "concept of prospect theory; that is, on the assumption that subtle changes in the wording of the description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret this situation" (Scheufele 2000, 309). This understanding of frames fits the definition by Entman, according to whom "framing entails *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution*" (2003, 417). [Original emphasis] Keeping in mind this definition of framing, while analyzing Kiselev's *Vesti nedeli,* we looked for the particular ways that the frames employed on the show encouraged the audience to interpret the conflict in Ukraine.

When journalists create a story, they need to employ a frame which is *meaningful* to at least some of their audience. In order to do so, news texts consist of "organized symbolic devices that will interact with individual agents' memory for meaning construction" (Pan and Kosicki 1993, 58). Since the meaning construction of an individual relies upon "individual-specific components as well as a shared component in a population" (Pan and Kosicki 1993), in order to be meaningful to a greater number of people, the frame needs to be rooted in the kinds of meaning-structures common to the majority of people. The resource for such structures is culture. "Culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be defined as an empirically demonstrable set of common

frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping" (Entman 1993, 53). According to Gamson and Modigliani, "[Cultural] resonances increase the appeal of a package; they make it appear natural and familiar" (1989, 5). Therefore, in our analysis of the frames employed on Kiselev's *Vesti nedeli*, similar to Reese (2010), we will use a qualitative approach to framing, looking for their cultural rooting.

As we will show in greater detail below, our analysis of Kiselev's shows detected two major frames implemented to represent the ongoing crisis in Ukraine: World War II and anti-American frames. Both are deeply rooted in Russian and Soviet history and culture and hence are very powerful in terms of their influence upon the contemporary Russian audience. The strength of the frames is manifested by the fact that state television, and, by extension, the regime behind it are not discredited by the hundreds of outright lies presented on the news every day. According to Schatz, "When the information being presented is implausible, it discredits itself and perhaps the regime with it" (2009, 207). The fact that television still remains the most trusted source of information in Russia (Volkov and Goncharov 2014) and that Putin has never been more popular suggest that the lies disseminated there are not perceived by Russians as such. We believe that the major explanation for that is the way the false facts are presented on television, in other words, the way they are framed.

The goal of our qualitative analysis was to understand the overall narrative of the frames, as well as to derive specific structural elements used in the construction of these frames. While watching and analyzing *Vesti nedeli*, we looked for distinctive "buzz words" representative of each frame employed. We understand such buzz words as framing devices: "specific linguistic structures such as metaphors, visual icons and catchphrases that communicate frames" (Reese 2010, 19). We chose the words that were "highly salient in the culture, which is to say *noticeable*, *understandable*, *memorable*, and *emotionally charged*" (Entman 2003, 417).

The purpose of using such buzz words in media is for them to be remembered and adopted by the general public as the tools to describe the reality around them. Thus, together with such words, a particular frame is adopted by the audience as well. Framing is not a concept that is solely confined to media. It is a much wider concept that originates in the basic mechanisms of the cognitive function of the human mind. Since the human mind is capable of comprehending only a limited amount of information, it requires frames to help "locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences" (Goffman 1975, 21). Thus frames can function as both the "central organizing idea" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3) and as individual "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman 1975, 21). Or, as Kinder and Sanders put it, as "internal structures of the mind" and "devices embedded in political discourse" (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 74).

In the quantitative section of our paper, we will take the words detected with the help of the qualitative analysis of the following section and test their popularity on the Yandex and Google search engines. Thus, we take the audience frame as a variable dependent on the media frames, (Scheufele 1999) and ask the following question: Have the frames implemented by Kiselev to present the Ukrainian crisis been generally adopted by Internet users? The answer to this question, in turn, gives us insight into whether and how Russian state-controlled television influences the Russian Internet sphere and whether "the Internet party" and the "television party" are as distinct as they were thought to be during Russia's 2011–2012 upheaval.

The World War II frame

What we refer to in this article as the World War II frame is an interpretive schema rooted in one of the main Russian national historical symbols – The Great Patriotic War. Having

conducted a qualitative analysis of Kiselev's shows, we have derived a set of words that in our opinion function as framing devices, that is, which serve to present the information about the crisis in Ukraine with reference to and in the context of the Great Patriotic War. The specific words representative of the World War II frame that we consider in this article are *fashisty* (fascists), *natsisty* (Nazis), *banderovtsy* (Bandera followers), *voennie prestupniki* (war criminals), and *blokada* (siege).We particularly explicate the term *fashisty* since it is the key term constituting the World War II frame as well as the major reason for its effectiveness.

For Russians, and for a lot of Ukrainians too, the word fascist is associated with all the horrors of World War II, or rather, even worse, with those responsible for inflicting them. For Russians, fascism has become the symbol of pure evil. It stands for an inhuman force that believes in its own superiority, desires world domination, and has neither mercy nor pity. In *Vesti nedeli*, Kiselev created an associative link between the terms fascists or, less often, Nazis, and the Kyiv government and everyone who supports it, like the Ukrainian army and even the West. The reincarnation of fascism in the West is a frequent theme on *Vesti nedeli*. At the same time, Russia is presented as a historically anti-fascist force, as a defender of the world against the fascist evil. The annexation of Crimea is presented in this light as well: the promoted storyline suggests that Russia has saved the Crimean territory from the fascist invaders from the West.

During the span of the 18 episodes that we analyzed, broadcast between 23 February 2014 and 13 July 2014, the fascist-related terms were invoked by Kiselev 61 times. Among them, 36 were used directly to describe the events in Ukraine. For example: " … Poroshenko promises to shoot hundreds of enemies for each killed soldier of his army – as did the maddened *fascist punishers* during the Great Patriotic War."[15] [emphasis added]. The rest, while not directly related to the crisis in Ukraine, are nonetheless implicitly connected to it. A good example from the same episode is a report under the headline "Lessons of the Holocaust: In Sevastopol, rabbis honored the memory of the victims of fascism."[16] The report quotes various Jewish leaders and survivors of the Holocaust who note that, unlike in Europe, in Russia nationalism is dying out and that they are impressed with the words and actions of Putin concerning this issue. "If Russia did not stop fascism then, I would not have been standing here. We all need to say 'thank you' to Russia. And today, I am positive, Russia will not allow fascism to develop,"[17] said one of the interviewed. In the context of the "fascist punishers" in Kyiv mentioned in the same episode several minutes earlier, this report, though not having a direct connection to the civil war in Ukraine, gives a very definite perspective upon Russia's present actions in the area – that is, as the defenders of the population against fascism – and creates a historical continuity with World War II.

The anti-American frame

While being very emotionally powerful, the World War II frame has an important shortcoming: it does not provide many tools for demonizing the USA. Meanwhile, anti-American sentiment is strong in Russian culture and is a great resource for national consolidation and a potential trigger for strong sentiments among Russians. Anti-American feelings having been growing since the end of the Soviet Union (though in a nonlinear manner) beginning among the elites, who then pass such attitudes to the masses (Zimmerman et al. 2013).

The anti-American frame is an interpretive schema rooted in Soviet nostalgia and in the ideas characteristic of the era of confrontation between East and West (Mendelson and

Gerber 2008). The central idea of the frame is the bipolarity of the world, with Russia representative of one pole and the USA of the other. The two poles are perceived as confrontational, and this confrontation is more than a geopolitical struggle, it is the struggle of civilizations – of East and West; it is a rivalry of cultural and moral values – of good and evil. The Cold War/anti-American frame presents the crisis in Ukraine, and particularly the annexation of Crimea from this perspective of the rivalry of the two civilizations – the "Russian Eurasian civilization" versus the "Atlantic civilization led by the USA" (Darczewska 2014, 7). The Cold War frame is used to present the conflict in Ukraine as having a wider geopolitical connotation than merely an inner political struggle within the neighboring country. Kiselev's *Vesti nedeli* presents the war in Ukraine as externally evoked by "the West," and in particular, by the USA, and thus portrays it as an act of aggression directed against Russia.

While a number of cases from Kiselev's show that we explore below are not directly related to the conflict in Ukraine, they are still important examples of how the show attempts to influence the audience to acquire a Cold War perspective and to generally adopt anti-American sentiments. And since at this point the war in Ukraine is the central piece of news occupying people's minds, and also since the associative link is created between the conflict and the USA, there is little doubt that Russian media succeeded in influencing the audience to perceive the events in Ukraine using the anti-American framing.

To analyze the anti-American frame, we will look at the three of its components that appear most frequently on the show: the arms race, the mockery of Americans, and criticisms of US foreign policy. The words that are exemplary of the three aspects of the Cold War frame are: Psaki, *Donald Cook*, *radioaktivnyi pepel* (radioactive dust), and *Systema Perimetr* (Dead Hand).

The theme of the arms race appears in the episode from 27 April with "*Donald Cook* vs. *Bastion*," where Kiselev talks about the American ship *Donald Cook* and claims that its presence near Russian shores in the Black Sea at that time is pointless due to the Russian coastal defense system Bastion. "*Bastion* will tear into pieces any floating metal," says Kiselev. The most glaring example of the theme of nuclear confrontation appears with Kiselev's infamous statement that Russia "is the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S. into radioactive dust."[18] In the same episode he mentions an article in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* about the Russian system of "Guaranteed [nuclear] retaliation" – *Systema Perimetr,* known in the USA as the Dead Hand, which ensures a retaliatory nuclear strike against the USA under any conditions (Valagin 2014). Kiselev not only directly suggests reading the article, but also summarized and graphically illustrated how *Perimetr* functions.

Another layer to the Cold War frame, involving the mockery of Americans, feeds off the common cultural ideas and prejudices about the USA, as well as the base sentiments of misogyny and racism. This layer includes jokes about American leaders and American political culture. Among the central targets of Kiselev's mocking is Jennifer Psaki – the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State. In the episode from 1 June, Kiselev accuses Psaki of "psaking," which according to him, is a term developed by Internet users which means making bold statements while confusing the facts and not apologizing afterwards. "Psaking," says he, "is the generalization that defined the quality of the entire American diplomacy, and ever more so, the quality of the global politics of the U.S."

Apart from Psaki, another object of Kiselev's mockery is the president of the USA himself. The major goal is to present Barack Obama as inferior to Russia's president Vladimir Putin. On top of showing that Obama is weak and afraid and is less of a man than Putin, it seems to be the goal of Kiselev to show him as an incarnation of the evil

Western mentality, obsessed with the idea of democracy, and incapable of understanding Russian values. Behind all the petty remarks in the direction of Psaki and Obama, as well as the praises towards Putin stands an attempt by Kiselev to propagate a particular idea of the struggle of geopolitical worldviews between Russia and the USA, which can only be best described in Kiselev's own words:

> Russia and the U.S. entered the third millennium having a different understanding of what a just world order is. And each took their start, wishing to offer to humanity their political designs. The USA, after the act of terror of September 11, became assured that it is the center of the world, and that the rest of the countries ought to be transformed. Obama in this sense is a political twin of Bush. No difference at all. Meanwhile, Russia has a different kind of leader. […] Vladimir Putin has been consistently adhering to the concept of a multipolar and a polycentric world. In such a construction, China remains China's, Armenia – Armenia's, Iran – Iran's and so forth … We stand for the multiformity and national singularity and for relationships between states on the basis of international law.[19]

Data analysis of Internet searches

The previous section laid out the primary "frames" that the Kremlin promotes through state-owned television programs. We now supplement this qualitative analysis with descriptive data to evaluate the Kremlin's success in framing the tone and content of public discussion. This section answers the following question: Is the Kremlin's message getting through?

The methodology that we chose to answer this question was to examine what kind of information Russians are searching for when they go online. Granka (2009) asserts that such search query data directly reflect issue salience because search engine users do not censure their search queries, while they might feel constrained in what they post on social sites or what they state publicly. Searches are truly uncensored thoughts. Thus, search query data complement the opinion survey data collected by public opinion pollsters like the Levada Center (the most independent and reliable pollster in Russia) and Gallup, whose respondents may feel as though they have an incentive to misrepresent their own opinions, particularly in more repressive environments. Further, while Levada and Gallup conduct their surveys periodically and charge researchers large fees, Russian Internet search data can be collected continuously and analyzed in weekly increments at no cost.

We chose to analyze data from Yandex, the most popular search engine in Russia, and Google, the second-choice Internet search engine for Russians. Yandex controls approximately 60% of the search engine market share in Russia, and Google controls 25% of market share (NASDAQ). We recognize that the Internet is used more widely by young, wealthy, urban, and educated groups within Russia, which prevents us from drawing strong conclusions about the domestic population as a whole. However, because of their dominant market shares, we determined that Google and Yandex would likely yield the most representative picture of Russian search interest among Internet users. Scholars have found convergent validity between Yandex and Google Trends in Russian search query data (Zheluk, Gillespie, and Quinn 2012). Accordingly, we feel confident that search query data from Yandex Wordstat and Google Trends reflect current trends in Internet users' interests.

While web surfers see Google and Yandex as search engines that help them find what they are looking for, the two companies that developed these tools make different kinds of data available to researchers. For each buzzword that we chose to track, we first used Yandex Wordstat to collect data on the absolute number of searches for each term, recorded in weekly increments. We then collected Google Trends data on the relative popularity of a query in searches over time. Relative query popularity, recorded as an index value between

zero and 100 by Google, measures the volume of searches for a term in a specified region relative to the total number of queries in that region from the time period under consideration (Choi and Varian 2012). Absolute search numbers allow for ready comparisons across terms, but unfortunately Google does not make absolute numbers data public. We conducted all searches in Russian using Cyrillic characters, but all words summarized are presented below in English translations and with the original Cyrillic search terms in parentheses.

Previous studies have produced the general consensus that additional media coverage shapes public perception of issue importance. Using vector autoregressive models, Ripberger (2011) found a significant correlation between spikes in media coverage of terms and spikes in their popularity on Google, confirming the convergence of media coverage and Google search trends. Ripberger's finding raises our confidence in the validity of determining public focus through Internet search query data.

Mellon (2014) cautions that the practical advantages of search query data over traditional opinion surveys have led some researchers to draw strong conclusions about public opinion that may not stand up to statistical validity tests. The data we gathered enable us to analyze the "first-level" salience of the various state-media-promoted topics. There is a theoretical distinction between "first-level" salience and "subsequent" conclusions about public behavioral responses. Behavioral responses – tangible expressions of opinion – are often observed through voting outcomes (Scharkow and Vogelgesang 2011). As numerous researchers have concluded (Rössler and Schenk 2000), the media are more effective in determining what topics the public choose to discuss than to persuade their audience to alter old opinions. We cannot conclude whether increased interest is positive or negative, or whether the audience will change their behavioral responses, by studying trends in query data. We instead seek to draw conclusions about whether the Kremlin has successfully changed the topic of online conversation and spread its messages widely. This is an analysis of "first-level" salience.

The terms

The terms that we chose to track in Yandex Wordstat and Google Trends derive from the agenda-setting frames we identified on *Vesti nedeli* during the development of the Ukraine crisis: World War II and Anti-Americanism. Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics about all of the words we present from each frame. All weekly minimum, weekly maximum, and mean values in Table 1 are derived from Yandex data.

Figure 1 aggregates the weekly Yandex search volumes for all World War II terms and for all anti-Americanism terms in order to compare the overall trends in popularity among these two frames. The data show that the audience initially associated the Ukraine events with the World War II frame, but then the anti-American framing became more dominant.

In order to measure the impact of Kiselev on the Internet, our initial strategy was to examine words that he had invented or plucked from obscurity so that we could trace them back directly to the show. However, most of the words that he invented did not generate significant numbers of searches for us to analyze (a finding that we discuss below). Therefore, some of the words and phrases we can trace directly to Kiselev, such as "Dead Hand" or "radioactive dust." Others words, such as "fascists" and "Psaki," were used frequently by Kiselev, but were also part of the general environment, so it is harder to link these words specifically to Kiselev as opposed to other Russian journalists. However, given that the Russian media is coordinated (probably self-coordinated), other journalists learn from Kiselev's leadership in the conservative Russian media, as we discuss above in our content analysis. He helped set the agenda focused heavily on

Table 1. Yandex search query data.

World War II	Anti-Americanism
Fascists (фашисты)	Psaki (Псаки)
Weekly max.: 62,447	Weekly max.: 245,760
Weekly min.: 11,049	Weekly min.: 18
Mean: 23,174	Mean: 21,688
Bandera supporters (бандеровцы)	Donald Cook (Дональд Кук)
Weekly max.: 134,135	Weekly max.: 59,147
Weekly min.: 1261	Weekly min.: 0
Mean: 21,333	Mean: 5188
Russophobia (русофобия)	Dead hand (Система Периметр)
Weekly max.: 17,508	Weekly max.: 106,730
Weekly min.: 406	Weekly min.: 263
Mean: 1553	Mean: 3907

Note: All mean values given in Table 1 are rounded to the nearest whole number.



Figure 1. Comparing World War II and anti-American Frames on *Vesti nedeli.*

Ukraine, and the content of *Vesti nedeli* has been representative of the Kremlin's stance. Accordingly, it seems highly likely that the vast majority of the spikes in searches we tracked were in the context of people thinking about the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, rather than external, unrelated references to World War II and anti-Americanism.

World War II

Figure 2 shows that the absolute number of searches for "fascists" has been increasing overall since the beginning of 2014. There were three peaks, in the beginning of February, in March, and in the middle of May. These spikes track closely with episodes in which



Figure 2. Searches for "Fascists" on Yandex.

Kiselev utilized "fascists" heavily to describe the Ukrainian government and its supporters.[20] The frame defined by this phrasing seemed to be gaining greater influence in each successive instance when "fascists" is reintroduced and repeated. This increased popularity online, in turn, prompts Kiselev to respond to the "fascists" idea on his show, perpetuating a cycle of influence between television and the Internet. Some of the increased interest in the word "fascists" might not be fully captured by absolute search volume, perhaps because this concept is already well known to Russians. However, the trend line is clear. The Google results shown in Figure 3 do not provide absolute numbers, but augment confidence in the Yandex findings because, as expected, the peaks are similar, with stronger peaks in March and May and an overall upward trajectory. (The drop off at the far right of the Google trend line in Figure 3 reflects a lack of data for the week rather than necessarily a decline in searches.)

Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism is a cornerstone in the Putin government's media strategy, as Russian policies are often defined directly in opposition to American foreign policy. We tracked "Psaki" (Псаки) and "Donald Cook" (Дональд Кук), names which are associated with anti-American headlines and that are specific to the time period under consideration. During the week of 16 June 2014 to 22 June 2014, Yandex reported 245,760 searches for "Psaki" in Russia. The rise in Russian searches for Psaki was meteoric; in her lowest week of popularity of the last twelve months from 30 December 2014 to 5 January 2014, Yandex users searched for "Psaki" a mere 18 times (Figure 4; for the Google figures, see Figure 5). The increase from 18 to 245,760 searches per week is an increase of approximately 13,652%.

USS Donald Cook is the American warship that was stationed in the Black Sea, where its crew conducted simulations with the Romanian Navy and the USS Taylor frigate in mid-April. In the wake of aggressive posturing from the Russian military, the U.S. Navy announced that the USS *Donald Cook* would retreat from the region on 24 April 2014. The withdrawal of the USS *Donald Cook* was promoted as a symbol of Russian dominance in Crimea by the Russian media; Kiselev went so far as to suggest that the ship's retreat was prompted by Obama's personal fear of Putin.[21] More broadly, the USS *Donald Cook*'s departure symbolized the Russian challenge to American and NATO naval interests. Our



Figure 3. Searches for "Fascists" on Google Trends.



Figure 4. Searches for "Psaki" on Yandex.



Figure 5. Searches for "Psaki" on Google Trends.

data indicate that popularity for "Donald Cook" among Yandex users peaked in the weeks of 14–20 April and 21–27 April respectively at 57,375 and 59,147 searches per week.

For these anti-American terms, which were primarily used by the Russian state television channels, interest spikes in Google mirrored those of Yandex. Whereas neither "Psaki" nor "Donald Cook" enjoyed attention in the past, both spiked in the short term after their television promotions, and maintained a higher baseline search interest after their peak interest periods ended. "Donald Cook" proved to be the less popular of the two terms, with a 5188 mean weekly search number compared to the 21,688 mean weekly search number corresponding to "Psaki" (Figures 6 and 7).

We found that the Russian media's efforts to revive the specter of Russo-American nuclear warfare also generated significant results online. "Dead hand," the term that refers to Russia's second-strike nuclear capabilities against the USA, was utilized by Kiselev in his program on 16 March 2014. In the week of 17–23 March, searches for "Dead hand" reached 106,730 (Figures 8 and 9). This marked a 457% rise over the previous week, and a 15,390% rise over the same week in February. "Dead hand" did not exhibit



Figure 6. Searches for "Donald Cook" on Yandex.



Figure 7. Searches for "Donald Cook" on Google.



Figure 8. Searches for "Dead hand" on Yandex.



Figure 9. Searches for "Dead hand" on Google.

online staying power at its peak numbers; however, its baseline popularity remained approximately five times higher in July 2014 than it was in July 2013.

Additionally, we detected a general increase in the number of searches for nuclear weapons. This additional finding substantiates our method, because it shows that by studying Kiselev we can detect general trends on Russian TV and that the searches can give us the understanding of the general mindset of Internet users.

Ineffective terms

Not all of the terms promoted by Kiselev gained significant popularity online. Some of the positively oriented words that both Kiselev and Putin used frequently in the spring of 2014 on television, such as "Russian character," did not reach the threshold of 10,000 searches per week at any point from the summer of 2013 to the summer of 2014 even as they achieved small peaks. Failed buzzwords also include "national traitors," "liberal ultras," "artful directors of terrorism," and "political earthquake."

Our findings suggest that one trend among several of the words that did not go viral is that they were not as radical or explicitly negative in tone as the successful words. This need



Figure 10. Searches for "Russian character" on Yandex.



Figure 11. Searches for "Russian Character" on Google.

to go to the extreme could have implications for the future of the Kremlin's media strategy; if negative and radical terms generate greater interest, we might expect the Kremlin to continue to gravitate toward aggressive, dramatic terms in order to wage Russia's information battle. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the lack of strong peaks in searches for Russian character.

Concluding remarks on data

The scales of the vertical axes in our Yandex search query graphs vary depending on the popularity of the depicted words. While the vertical axis for our least popular term, "Russian character," extends from 0 to 9000 searches per week, the vertical axis of our most popular term, "Psaki," extends from 0 to 300,000 searches per week. To understand these numbers, it is helpful to establish a baseline for the number of search queries per week among relevant, widely popular figures and concepts in Russia. For instance, from July 2013 to July 2014, weekly search volume for "Obama" (Обама) never dipped below 13,352 searches per week and never exceeded 285,922 searches per week. This comparison

throws the sheer magnitude of popularity for agenda-setting terms such as "Psaki" depicted above into stark relief: the peak search volume of Psaki trailed that of Obama by only about 40,000 searches per week.

To extend our inferences about Kiselev's impact online, we also tracked the popularity of the search term "Kiselev." We found that between July 2013 and July 2014, searches for "Kiselev" have steadily increased in both Google and Yandex, but with spikes in December 2013 and March 2014. The March 2014 spike in Kiselev's popularity, in which "Kiselev" generated 153,549 hits per week, is particularly noteworthy in our analysis, as it spanned 17–23 March. This was the same week in which Kiselev's focus shifted to nuclear warfare with the USA, and in which he touted Russia's "Dead hand" capability.

In order to put Kiselev in context we compared him to the famed opposition blogger Alexei Navalny (Навальный). Navalny is the most effective of Russia's Internet personalities, who rarely appears on Russian television or is mentioned there. Although his popularity has been declining in the face of Kremlin-driven court cases against him, search queries reached 505,394 per week in 15–21 July 2013 – much higher than we observed for any of the Kremlin's agenda-setting terms, or indeed for Kiselev himself. At the lowest point in the 12 months between July 2013 and July 2014, however, search queries per week for Navalny had fallen to 22,195 for 9–15 June 2014. This result is an interesting complement to our findings for several reasons. For one, we note that the initial high popularity of Navalny online is predictable, as Navalny appeals to the younger, more educated group that is primarily active online. Interestingly, due to the rapid drops in search queries for Navalny, we might conclude that the Kremlin censorship has been successful in diverting attention from Navalny's oppositional messages, even among the group that is predisposed to Navalny's opinion.

Television and Internet in Russia

The data and analysis presented here help us address the questions that we raised at the beginning of the article: Did the Russian Internet audience accept the state television framing to understand the Ukrainian conflict? Does it make sense to speak of separate Internet and television parties?

Did the Russian Internet audience accept the state television framing to understand the Ukrainian conflict?

Our overall conclusion is that the Russian Internet audience did accept the two frames propounded by Kiselev's show and Russian state television generally. As the quantitative Internet search query data indicated, Russian Internet users did search more often for terms associated with World War II and anti-American frames, such as "fascists," "Psaki," and nuclear weapons during the period of time when these frames were propagated on Russian television.

There are several reasons why this framing was important. First, the frames were culturally resonant with common ways of thinking for Russians and fit well with their existing conceptions of how the world works. The frame fit particularly well with the type of Soviet nostalgia that Putin promotes.

Second, the frames addressed a foreign policy issue where Russian television viewers have less alternative information to contextualize what they were seeing on television. While playing an essential role of meaning construction, frames, naturally, entail a bias since they encourage a particular perspective upon the set of facts. The way to resolve

this bias is usually to have alternative frames and alternative sources of information. When it comes to foreign policy issues, it is harder for Russians to find the alternative frames within the country. Around the world, not just in Russia, the media often presents foreign policy news in conformity with the government's line. However, in Russia the situation is aggravated due to the extensive official suppression of alternative media. Also, the Russian media not only gives a certain perspective on a set of facts, but also by emphasizing and selectively presenting information, they simply lie. Examples of lies are plenty and can be found on websites like stopfake.org.

Finally, the Russian media has framed the Western media as telling lies, engaging in an information war, and providing frames that are false. In essence, Russian media has made it even more difficult for the Russian audience to accept alternative points of view. In his show, for example, Kiselev makes the argument that in the area of freedom of speech, Russia and the West have changed places, with Russia now being the main defender of individuals' ability to speak out.[22] Through its combination of sincere support for this concept and satire of it (Dunn and Bobick 2014), Russia is effectively undermining the Western conceptions of civil and political liberties.

Influence of state television on the Internet

Our findings show that the Internet and television influence each other in a continuous loop and help define a mechanism for explaining how the influence works. The Google and Yandex searches for the key terms of Kremlin framing show that mention of these terms in the state media did have an impact on the searches of the Russian Internet users. The appearance of a concept in the traditional media typically caused a large spike in interest in that term as a quick glance at the figures presented above show. However, the Kremlin propagandists who control state television are not always effective in defining words and concepts that shape public opinion. As our data show, many of the words that Kiselev used did not go viral. These failures suggest that the Kremlin propagandists try a variety of ideas, and while some are effective, many do not resonate with society and are discarded.

The flow is not consistently from television to the Internet. The Internet provides a much larger petri dish for developing new terms and concepts than what the Kremlin spin doctors can develop on their own. In this sense, the Kremlin media czars take advantage of crowdsourcing, scouring the Internet for good ideas which they can adopt. In some cases, we found evidence of this process at work. Some of the most successful terms, like Psaki, seemed to start on the Internet, but then received a major boost from being mentioned on state television. In this sense, the Internet can serve to incubate new ideas, which are then amplified through the state media, and broadcast back to the Internet in a spiraling loop.

Are there separate Internet and television parties in Russia?

Our data suggest that the picture is more complicated than presented by observers who claim that there are separate Internet and television parties in Russia. We argue that it does not make sense to divide the Russian population neatly into these two groups. Our finding shows that the Internet audience did generally accept the two frames propounded by Russian state television, implying that at least when it comes to the issue of Ukraine, the Internet and the television "parties" are not as distinct as was previously believed by some.

However, a different, more optimistic picture arises once we compare the way in which linguistic entrepreneurs like Kiselev and Navalny affect the masses of the Internet. The

phrases propounded by Kiselev and state television had nowhere near the resonance with the public that Navalny did as recently as the summer of 2013, when he was running for mayor of Moscow. Then there were nearly 500,000 searches for "Navalny," while the best of Kiselev's phrases drew no more than 250,000.

These findings indicate that Russia's state propaganda has not had as deep an impact on the part of the Russian population that uses the Internet as it seems. (Of course, our data do not tell us anything about the part of the population that watches TV but does not use the Internet.) While the onslaught of propaganda has boosted Putin's ratings and silenced critics, it does not seem to have sunk into the thinking of large numbers of Internet users deeply enough to get them to search for the terms the Kremlin wants them to use beyond the few that are culturally resonant.

Given Navalny's greater success earlier with far fewer resources than the Kremlin has, the Kremlin will have to maintain a similar or growing level of effort to maintain its dominance in Russia's information space. Additionally, the state has an extensive arsenal of tools that it is increasingly using to limit the influence of alternative information on the Internet, ranging from blocking access to sites, intimidating users offline so that they censor themselves, employing an army of trolls to deflect discussion, and many others. Any relaxation could provide an opening for a new opposition campaign that could successfully promote alternative leaders to Russia's current rulers even if the movement supporting them does not have significant resources. Such a scenario is the Kremlin's worst nightmare and one that does not go away even at the height of its apparent success (Snegovaya 2014). In other words, to maintain its position and to keep its opponents at bay, the Kremlin will have to resort to increasingly hysterical media coverage. That is not a sustainable strategy.

Notes

1. For the Levada Center data since 1999, see http://www.levada.ru/indeksy, accessed 26 January 2015.
2. *Rossiia Segodnia* translates to "Russia Today" but should not be confused with the English-language news network RT, formerly known as Russia Today. Though the two outlets claim mutual independence, both share Putin sympathizer Margarita Simonyan as their creative editor-in-chief.
3. In the poll, 8% of respondents named Kiselev, second only to Vladimir Solovyov with 13%. See "Otnoshenie k zhurnalistam" [Attitude Towards Journalists] by the Public Opinion Foundation, available at: http://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/11428, accessed 26 January 2015.
4. All data on ratings are from the TNS site, available at: http://www.tns-global.ru/, accessed 25 January 2015. See also Schimpfossl and Yablokov (2014).
5. A list of entities and individuals under sanction is available at: http://www.vedomosti.ru/special/countrysanct.shtml, accessed 26 January 2015.
6. "Dmitriia Kiseleva nagradili ordenom 'Za zaslugi pered Otechestvom'" [Dmitrii Kiselev Was Awarded the Order "For Service to the Fatherland"], Lenta.ru, 17 February 2014, available at: http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/17/kiselev/, accessed 26 January 2015.
7. "Dmitrii Kiselev i Oleg Dobrodeiev stali sovetnikami Putina v oblasti russkogo yazyka" [Dmitrii Kiselev and Oleg Dobrodeiev Became Advisers to Putin in the Field of Russian Language], *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 9 June 2014, available at: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/06/09/dmitriy-kiselev-i-oleg-dobrodeev-stali-sovetnikami-putina-v-oblasti-russkogo-yazyka.html, accessed 26 January 2015.
8. The texts of the decrees are available at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/19806 and http://kremlin.ru/acts/19805, accessed 26 January 2015.
9. Interview transcript between Elena Rykovtseva and Matviey Ganapolski, *Radio Svoboda*, 13 December 2013, available at: http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/25199504.html, accessed 26 January 2015.

10. "Dmitrii Kiselev: Ia ne propagandist i ne gomofob" [I Am Neither a Propagandist Nor Homophobe], RBK, 4 April 2014, available at: http://top.rbc.ru/society/04/04/2014/915620.shtml, accessed 26 January 2015.
11. See Kiselev's comments on the politico-historical talk-show "Istoricheskii protsess," broadcast on 4 April 2012, in episode "No. 19: Government and personal life," available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyvE16z6FrI (accessed 7 August 2014).
12. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiia 1 TV, 27 April 2014.
13. Alexei Navalny, "Byt' luche ryb" [To Be Better Than Fish], available at: http://navalny.com/p/3686/, accessed 26 January 2015.
14. "Samye zapominaiushchiesia sobytiia" [The Most Memorable Events], Levada Center, 26 June 2014, available at: http://www.levada.ru/26-06-2014/samye-zapominayushchiesya-sobytiya, accessed 26 January 2015.
15. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 13 July 2014.
16. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 13 July 2014.
17. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 13 July 2014.
18. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 16 March 2014.
19. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 13 July 2014.
20. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 16 March 2014, 20 April 2014, and 27 April 2014.
21. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 27 April 2014.
22. *Vesti nedeli*, Rossiya 1 TV, Moscow, 27 April 2014.

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